Hate 2.0

Felix Nicol

Though Fascism and far-right Nationalism are often clumped together for their similar ideologies, this week’s readings provided us with nuanced views on the common hypocrisies generated by different regimes. In both his New York Times and Journal articles, David Motadel underlines two sides of the same coin: much as the modern nationalist groups look towards internationalism to offer support for their cause, so too did anti-imperial movements of the 20th century. This offers us a significant insight in the reality of these regimes: their success is dependent on something they fundamentally oppose. Hitler’s remarks vis-à-vis cooperation with other anticolonialists provide us with more proof that even if these movements are inherently national, their success is largely dependent on international support. After all, if one makes an enemy of the whole world outside of the nation, the number of enemies grows exponentially faster than that of allies.

On another note, Hanebrink’s book on Judeo-Bolshevism provides us with a historical similarity to the manipulative use of the Middle Ages by modern far-right nationalists. We see a striking resemblance in the methods used, anecdotal evidence tied with historical legacies of a nation or region used as validation of one’s ideals. Succinctly, Hanebrink explains the key aspect of these mental gymnastics, stating that “Although sometimes they were ­ completely wrong, the stubborn fact remained: Some Jews were ­ Communists” (p. 20). Through this understanding, we need to consider the actions of modern nationalist movements as parts of history, with their methods rooted in their historical legacy. This especially when considering the effects of social media in the matters of propagation of misinformation.

In perspective, internationalism does not seem like a concept that would apply to populist and fascist movements but these groups have proven otherwise. Even though they talk about how “dirty” internationalism is, these groups are ready to associate with one and other to gain traction, publicity, and legitimacy. “We will not give up our identity; I think that unites us all.” This quote from Jörg Meuthen, a member of the European Parliament from the Alternative for Germany party that author David Motadel uses in his article depicts exactly why contradiction is a word associated with such movements. Identity in a cultural or political group is something very important to them and they will try to protect it to the best of their abilities. What makes them special is that they stand out from the rest of the world; it’s their struggle, their fight, their way. When populist and nationalist movements start to associate it creates the problem that these groups are starting to lose their initial goal that prioritize their people first. Associating with another group that wants to stand out as different sets up tensions inside their association because they won’t have identical views about every topics, but they will fight over it. It feels like the original uniqueness of the nationalist organization then becomes less important because it is not all about them in particular anymore. While the leaders of these movements despise internationalism, they still opt to try it so they can the advantages that comes with it.

by Kaileigh La Belle

Many of this week’s readings focused on fascist contradictions regarding internationalism. Consequently, my initial reaction was to consider what implications this has for our understanding of fascism. However, in considering the readings more deeply, it became evident to me that it was not just fascist practices that involved contradiction but also their discourses on internationalism. As the readings illustrate, internationalism took on different meanings to achieve various goals. In some instances, such as those presented in Motadel’s work, internationalism did not deny the existence of a nation-state and, thus, fascist states were willing to collaborate across borders, presenting themselves as an ally for international liberation (in this case, anticolonialism); meanwhile, in other fascist discourses, such as those examined in Hanebrink and Ben-Ghiat, internationalism could not be anything less than a carefully orchestrated ‘plot’ designed to erode away at national identity and tradition, a narrative which fascists used to justify violence. As each reading makes clear, analysis on fascist contradiction in practice and policy explains why fascists were willing to do so, that is to advance other nationalistic, authoritarian projects. Yet I feel that it is equally important to examine how discourse was strategically employed as a means of achieving these goals. Ultimately, these readings make it clear that discourse is a tool employed to negotiate contradictions. In the constant manipulation of discourse, contradictory things became simultaneously true. These readings, in examining how fascist ideology and practice approach internationalism differently, and in doing so made internationalism mean different things, demonstrate the whys and hows of the fascist relationships to internationalism. As these discourses are apparent in fascist thought and can also drive practice, they exemplify the need for nuance in examining the disparities between the thought and regime of ‘isms’ noted by Finchelstein. 

Work cited: 

Ben-Ghiat, Ruth “Conquest and Collaboration”. In Fascist Modernities: Italy, 1922-1945. University of California Press, 2004.

Finchelstein, Frederico. “Introduction: Thinking Fascism and Populism in terms of the Past” in From Fascism to Populism in History, 1-30. University of California Press, 2017.

Hanebrink, Paul. A Specter Haunting Europe: The Myth of Judeo-Bolshevism. Harvard University Press, 2018. 

Motadel, David. “The Global Authoritarian Moment: The Revolt Against Empire.” American Historical Review Vol. 124, Issue 3 (July 2019): 843-877.

By Jim Dagg

The Ben-Ghiat reading shows that Mussolini wanted an Italian-controlled empire: that’s the twisted take on internationalism for Italian Fascism. Mussolini expected that possession of his new empire would provide a means to develop and demonstrate the superiority of the Italian male, and especially the Italian soldier. Events shows that Empire was not a good fit: the military resorted to gas attacks to control the natives; and colonists – especially from the south of Italy (called “Italy’s own Africa”) – weren’t up to challenge of acting as the noble and superior manager.

Hitler wasn’t interested in overseas empire: his attention was on the European empire he wanted for Germany. Motadel’s academic article shows that he was willing to engage with anti-colonial authoritarians who might help his cause. Most of these were exiles from British colonies, who might create distraction for the British, and also serve as like-minded authoritarians in the event of successful revolution. Hitler apparently regretted not making better use of this opportunity. The fact is that he was focused on Europe and he didn’t look at that as an internationalist move, but rather as simple dominance.

Motadel’s NYTimes article identifies two Fascist initiatives that come closest to being internationalist in nature. He highlights the Spanish Civil War and the Anti-Comintern Pact. These two showed that far-right organizations time could collaborate at least to the extent of targeting a common enemy. Motadel believes today’s far-right groups will work together similarly – for example to undermine the European Union. He doubts though that more constructive international collaboration is likely, as members of these nationalist groups are highly focused on their local concerns. Historically, during WWII, suspicion and selfishness prevented constructive collaboration among the Axis partners – and Spain for that matter. Fascists mostly don’t do Internationalism.

Hanebrink’s article on the “Myth of Judeo-Bolshevism” provides more evidence of this. One of the common villainizing characterizations against Jews was that they were “root-less” border-crossers. Of course, this was combined with worse accusations, but it’s relevant to emphasize this aspect. People from away – call them internationals – are undesirable/despicable to Fascists.

The readings this week look at the international aspects of nationalist movements. When first discovering this in the reading it felt like an oxymoron, nationalist by nature should be sceptical of any internationalism but yet there seems to be a long track record of nationalist groups working together throughout history.

As the photo above demonstrates, I shouldn’t have been surprised about the international flavour that nationalism can have. Tucker Carlson (famed American nationalist), has made headlines this year by doing live shows from authoritarian that countries such as Hungary and Brazil. These shows are often spent fawning over whatever recent policy or authoritarian move Orban or Bolsonaro made, talking them and their governments up to his FOX audience. This move makes sense for both the nationalist movement in the United States and for the nationalist movements in the host countries. It aggrandizes their movements while promoting and garnering support from the worlds “leading nationalist movement”.

The move to be supported by a larger nationalist power/movement is one that is seen throughout the readings. In the reading by David Motadel, he describes how anti-colonial nationalists came to Nazi Berlin to garner support for there movements against their colonial oppressors. Though the Nazis and Hitler did not hold individuals from the anywhere but Europe in high regard they aided them as an effort in their wartime strategy. This idea of mutually beneficial relationships despite glaring differences is a key aspect of nationalistic internationalism.

The mutually beneficial nationalistic International relationships are highlighted in Motadel’s new York Times piece. In it he talks about the growing number of right wing nationalists being elected to the European Parliament. He discusses how French and Italian nationalist parties have begun to unite with eastern European nationalists to create a right wing voting bloc within the parliament. Though they are united on certain issues such as immigration, the way each nation wishes to deal with these problems differs vastly. This is the central issue with the nationalist internationalism, as they all wish to put their own nation first, their priorities and solutions are rarely aligned with one another or they are outright butting heads. On the issue of Russia Western nationalists are much more sympathetic to Putin and his invasion of the Ukraine in comparison to the eastern European nationalists who greatly distain Putin and his continued threat to their nations sovereignty.

What I have taken from these readings is that we must be conscience of the continued internationalism that nationalists use to bolster their own and nationalist movements around the globe. We must also be aware of the major potholes they must navigate themselves on major global issues that can tear these budding coalitions apart.

Edward Said’s discourse of Orientalism is a productive lens through which to view the far right’s use of a racial ‘other’ in order to identify and consolidate the nation. For Said, the ‘Orient’ was a floating signifier, over-determined and malleable, that could be whatever the West needed it to be (Orientalism, 21). He also identified Orientalist discourse as drawing upon the tropes and vocabulary of the older European discourse of antisemitism. This similarity is made explicit in Hanebrink’s chapter on Judeo-Bolshevism, in which Jews are identified as the leaders of both international capitalist and Communist conspiracies (6), and the human manifestations of revolution (13). As the Jews killed Christ, therefore prefiguring the anti-Christ, so they defy borders, therefore becoming the anti-nation (8). Like Said’s ‘Orientals’, Jews in the twentieth century were a conveniently floating signifier. Bolshevism was a new threat. Jews were an old threat. Therefore, Bolshevism was Jewish (27). Motadel’s article makes clear the centrality of convenience in the application of racial policy, and the conceptual malleability of ‘the Jew’ was convenient because of its use in nation building. Hanebrink states that “Jews and Judaism gave coherence to a variety of cultural visions by suggesting what their inversion might look like” (28). What is the West? Not the Orient. What is any given ethnic national? Not a (cosmopolitan, Bolshevik) Jew. Jews also allowed a nation’s problems to be blamed on non-national actors. For example, Ben-Ghiat describes how Italy was able to use the Jew to replace the southern Italian as a scapegoat for Italian underachievement, a definite improvement from the perspective of nation building (154). A constructed racial ‘other’, it would seem, can be a nation’s best friend.

After considering this week’s material, it feels like fascism’s relationship to internationalism is intentionally flexible, which allows it to make contradictory claims that benefit its national cause. When reading last week’s material on defining populism, one of the elements that stood out to me was the suggestion that populism lacks an ideology in it itself, instead attaching itself to existing political beliefs without disrupting them. At the time, I had assumed this lack of ideology is what separated populism and fascism, since fascists clearly have a strict, uncompromising worldview. While maybe fascism cannot camouflage itself quite as well as populism, in reflecting on this week’s reading I feel like fascism is much more flexible than I had previously thought. I think this flexibility may speak to how fascism is emotionally driven rather than ideologically, like other traditional political ideologies. Rather than conform their actions to an ideological framework, fascists create their own meaning for elements that support their movement. This allows them to be contradictory and shift their stance as they see fit, since an intellectual-base isn’t the source of their authority.

By extension then, I think fascist governments can maintain a contradictory stance toward internationalism without decreasing its validity because their ideology is so flexible. This allows for anti-internationalism and pro-internationalism views to exist within the same body of fascist thought, so long as both support the overall movement. Having a looming, existential international enemy in the form of Judeo-Bolshevism or liberal democracies is extremely effective in their fear-mongering, creating a single enemy for their national army to violently rally against in the creation of their nation. The Judeo-Bolshevism is especially good considering how variable interpretations of a supposed Jewish communist revolution have shifted dramatically, allowing each state to make its own specific claims and arguments that speak to their national circumstances while remaining tied to the overall antisemitic movement. At the same time, placing yourself in a global anti-liberal/antisemitic movement adds further validity to fascist “ideology” while providing the strategic benefit of allies (more support in the international system, resources, e.c.t.).