Hate 2.0

With the final reading response of the semester, we have come full circle: In Week 2 on Defining Terms, I wrote the following: 

Defined as “a set of ideas focused on a fundamental opposition between the people and the elite,” I believe populism has in part gained prominence due to increased online connectivity. The media landscape today…allows for a broader range of opinions and values. 

Week 11’s readings echoed the above idea that populist parties have utilized online environments to connect and mobilize a broader audience of potential voters. Hatakka notes the rise of right-wing populism in Europe has coincided with online far-right activism. According to Mudde, this is no mere coincidence: today’s media landscape has provided access and coverage for populist politicians that were not formerly available. 

While an engaged populous is good for democracy, there are dangers with the modern day networked society. As indicated by Slavíčková & Zvagulis and Doerr, “new racism” has emerged and consequently facilitated hate speech in the media. Slavíčková & Zvagulis’s study considers how new racism is found in the wording of news stories, including journalistic skewing and the absence of minority voices. Doerr’s take on new racism instead looks at media imaging, specifically arguing how visual devices like political cartoons reinforce anti-immigrant discourse. This likens back to the Matthews article, as he argues European right-wing populist parties such as UKIP, Front National and AfD have used the media to spread anti-immigration messaging, in particular racist messaging against Islam. 

Hate speech is certainly not new to Europe: Göle harkens back to the destruction of the Mostar Bridge— a symbol connecting the Muslim and Christian communities in Bosnia—was strategically shelled as a not so subtle religious statement by Croatian gunman while fighting the Bosnian Muslims. However, the “connective action” online phenomenon described by Hatakka offers much different conditions for media networking as what came before. Now, the internet has eased the ability for people with similar political interests to meet, organize, debate and expand their outreach like never before. 

While increasing online engagement is often positive for society, Freedman argues the current liberal approach to media policy has enabled the far-right to exploit communication systems. Notably, populists have effectively spread political messages based on sentiment over fact. This is important, as Feldmen argued in Week 2 how notes how nationalism morphed into fascism by going beyond politics and building a king of “political religion.” As we see populist leaders have continually played on people’s emotions, Freeman emphasizes the dangers of the policy inaction to mediate racist populist messaging and skewed media environments. 

At the conclusion of the semester, I still believe my words from Week 2, that “under a democratic democracy, we will not see the likes of fascism in the West reborn.” However, after Week 11, I believe the knock-on effects of a run-away media landscape dominated by right-wing, anti-immigrant rhetoric cannot be ignored. 

By Daniel Williams

Mainstream media is a catchphrase that has gotten a lot of traction recently. It’s use tries to coalesce a sense of ‘Big News’, similar to Big Pharma or Big Oil. The concept is that there exist a large number of major news media formats and organizations that are intertwined, promoting messaging that benefits all of them through sensationalizing stories, building up dangerous messages, and keeping the general public in the dark by only ever displaying one side of the story.

This is the focus of Populism and media policy failure. In this article, the news is portrayed as having effectively been complicit in the rise of major populist figures. It suggests that structural conditions within news media have effectively established requisite conditions to cause populist figures to use fake news, half-truths and conspiracy theories to fuel their rise.

As right wing populism has become more salient so too has the institution of journalism alongside social media. With this in mind, can we track the role that journalism has played in shaping the development of right wing populism? Moreover, can we distinguish between the role that specific journalists have played from the institution of journalism itself? 

In the case of Czech journalist’s depiction of roma peoples in the media as highlighted by Tess Slavíčková and Peter Zvagulis in their article “Monitoring Anti-Minority Rhetoric in the Czech Print Media: A Critical Discourse Analysis,” the media reported on Roma peoples in very derogatory terms. So much so that the Roma fight was ultimately put out of context. It takes the event out of context and provides fodder for racial tension. But is this reflective of the misgivings of actual journalists or problems in the institution of journalism in a broader sense? We ought to consider that journalists might not actual receive proper training to handle complicated events like the above mentioned. The article does pose this question, but maybe we can take it even further and ask if the institution of journalism itself is entrenched with racism that has not yet been addressed. 

The role of journalism and journalists is at the epicentre of “Populism and media policy failure” by Des Freedman. It addresses the way that the mainstream media affected the results and reactions to Brexit and the election of Donald Trump. Specifically, there was a shared atmosphere of shock and disbelief in response to the elections. However, these reactions failed to acknowledge the way that the media is often complicit, though not solely responsible for, the rise of right wing populism. The article particularly takes to task media “elites” and liberal news media who fail to represent these issues in a nuanced and diverse way. 

To conclude, while journalists and journalism should not shoulder the blame for the prevalence of right wing populism, it at least needs to be included in the conversation. In doing so, it can become a means with which to contest these movements.

By Alex Wittmann

In the day and age in which we live, mass media and news outlets of a wide degree of sources contribute a great deal to how one sees the world and formulates their own opinions. The Populists of the Far Right have used and exploited mass media in order to advance their movement and gain following. I am in agreeance with the article that unregulated digital media platforms have become the breeding ground for reactionary movements to take hold. The fact that that Liberal media was in shock that Populist movements such as Trump’s election and the UK’s decision to leave the EU shows arrogance on the part of mainstream media and their inability to acknowledge that there are certain structural issues with unregulated platforming that allows for reactionary Right Wing movements to gain traction based on unregulated platforming. Social Media plays a very large role in reactionary movements because the platforming is set up in such a way that anyone can say whatever they want and spread as many lies as they want without the risk of fact checking. There are no limits as to what political ads can be platformed either. In fact, Facebook founder and CEO Mark Zukerberg said before a Congressional hearing that Facebook will not stop far right ads and misinformation from circulating, he said that it is up to the viewer to decide what is credible or not. The article calls for a redistributive model that funds grassroot journalism able to cater to a wide range of audiences, separate of political affiliation willing to hold power to account without being held by vested corporate interests. This sounds like a good idea in theory but I believe that Populism will always find a way to get its message across on social media. The people who support such movements are highly passionate and motivated to throw their support behind the Populist cause. If they see any attempt by the media to curb their perceived “free speech,” it could likely result in rebellion far worse than the one in which brought Populist sentiments through the media into power. The process of regulating media must be done carefully.

D. Freedman, “Populism and media policy failure” European Journal of Communication
33(6)(2018): 604-618

Des Freedman’s Populism and media failure discusses many ways in which media policy allows for far-right populist movements to utilize the platforms for their own benefits. He looks at how big media companies hold a monopoly over different media outlets, how many people who write for medias outlet come from certain economic backgrounds, and he discusses the way in which there is no true independent, bi-partisan media outlet because of elites in-charge that so greatly oppose far-right populist action, which in-turn provides them with a platform for them to utilize. Freedman’s solution to this issue is clear, redistribution of the monopoly.

This solution overall makes sense in terms of policy failure. Social media is used more and more everyday, and information is consumed on a much larger scale that it ever has before. Freedman does say that this rise has increased the way in which far-right populists are given even more room to interact with the people. Though what is interesting is that his analysis is very focused on economic divide. I think that there should be focus on how generational divides affect the way in which policy is made, and how it would affect this solution of redistribution.

Different generation interact and consume media differently. I think it interesting to look at how younger generations use social media and acknowledge the faults in these policies, versus those who are less incline to understand how media can make room for a far-right populist voice.

This is not to say that there is nothing wrong with policy, because there is. But how does generation play in the execution of these policies, or how do different generations of consumers interact and are aware of these faults. If there are not solutions to this policy failure, then how does being aware and understanding these failures while consuming media affect the success of far-right populists use of media? And how does ‘cancel culture’ that is used more by the younger generation fit into how different generations interact with policy failures?

It would be lying to assert that political cartoons are just there to relieve the public from difficult topics or moments but when it reaches a transnational level, we are forced to admit that their power can be dangerous. Using humoristic drawings to send a xenophobic message is the tool that ethno-nationalists have utilize to gather more partisans for their political agendas. Cartoons are an easy way to transmit an underlined message and the “black sheep” example that started to circulate in Switzerland in 2007 is no stranger to this method of reaching a massive crowd nationally and transnationally.

Nicole Doerr wrote an interesting study on the use of the “black sheep” cartoon and how its distribution and adaptation in Germany and Italy illustrate the power of visual media. In the article, the author states that the dichotomy of colours is one part of the controversy and that the written text adds a stronger signification especially when it is translated in another language or for another country. Associating the visual and verbal messages, she demonstrates that the ambiguity of the colour choice helps carrying the ideas of former fascist discourses in Italy or Germany.

Would the cartoon have the same effect if the chosen colours or the animals would have been different ? The idea of the black sheep is not racial in its general context: the difference within a group is not always based on race. However, the deliberate choice by the SVD ( Swiss People’s Party) to use this analogy makes it racial.

Once copied in Germany and Italy, the message takes a meaning that reflects the preoccupations of the country’s political agenda . The semiotic translation has gained a higher level of controversy in the fact that it encompasses the anti-immigration, xenophobic rhetoric used by respective far-right parties. Based on a possible bond that exists between these three countries, the text contains words that appeal to a nationalistic and more radical discourse about immigration.

How far can cartoonists go in their representation of actual problems ? The Netherlands and France have dearly paid for representing images that should not have been drawn. Knowing the massive role that visual media carries out and the absence of censorship in the press in many countries, the representation of tragic situations in a cartoonish manner is benefitting transnational far-right parties who then can capture the attention of an emotional public in a more or less subtle way.

Work cited :

N. Doerr, “Bridging language barriers, bonding against immigrants: A visual case study of transnational network publics created by far-right activists in Europe” Discourse & Society 28(1) (2017): 3–23.

Populist movements have demonstrated the ability to navigate and influence their messages across both mainstream media and social media. This week’s readings showcased a wide range of the methods being used by these populist movements. I have tried to categorize the readings into three main methods used by populists: capitalize on the mainstream media’s complicity, ability to shape the narrative, and exploitation of social media and unregulated digital platforms. These methods have resulted in populists being able to “to transmit ‘sentiment’ over ‘fact’, to use ‘authentic’ language, to make full use of social media and to exploit the mainstream media’s appetite for sensationalist stories” (Freedman).

Capitalize on mainstream media’s complicity

In Populism and media policy failure, Des Freedman argues that populist leaders and movements have been able to exploit mainstream media’s lack of attention around “the structural conditions and policy frameworks that have facilitated the circulation of clickbait and misinformation”. The article by Slavickova & Zvagulis also points to complicity in print media. In their review of Czech print media, they found that there are problems of contextualization and otherization of minorities, framing that overstates (and contributes to) racial tension in the Czech Republic.

Ability to shape the narrative in news cycles

In a similar vein as Freedman, Hatakka argues that “populists’ strategies of provoking the media into prolonged coverage of their scandalous actions can be regarded to grant them agenda-setting and framing power by providing visibility and political weight”. What I find particularly interesting in populist movements ability to shape the narrative is the idea that there is no real losing over media coverage. By this I mean, populists employ sensationalist claims in order to gain extensive media coverage. however, when this does not work, due to the mainstream media boycotting coverage of populist movements, these groups are able to rally their base by claiming that this is proof that the mainstream media are ‘corrupt’. In the end, populists are either able to be seen by a larger public or are able to rally their base, both of which I see as a win for the populists.

Exploiting Social Media and Unregulated Digital Platforms

Lastly, the populist’s ability to effectively use social media and unregulated digital platforms (such as HommaForum) has resulted in electoral gains. Hatakka references the works of Lance Bennett and Alexander Sergber, who put forward the idea that “digital communication technologies have provided not only new tools for political organization, but a whole new logic to political identity formation and group formation.” Viewing social media and alternative digital platforms in this light, it is easy to see how populists’ groups have used these platforms to create their groups identities.

Until the mainstream media and conventional political parties are able to adapt to newer digital platforms, I believe that populists movements will be able to gain more support. What is worrying to me though is the risk that politics on digital platforms will never achieve a positive outlook for politics, rather it will at a minimum remain an echo chamber of ideas, at worse we will see further divergence between parties with no hope to bridge to other groups.