Hate 2.0

By Christine Collins

Bar-On attributes the transnational success of the Nouvelle Droite (ND) outside of France to three key factors. One of these is the prestige of the ND leader, Alain de Benoist. An intellectual, philosopher, political commentator and—perhaps most importantly—an ultranationalist, Benoist was able to “capture the hearts and minds of the masses” through his personal appeal to the average Frenchman, and eventually Europeans transnationally. 

Leaders like Benoist are able to more easily challenge the status quo through their cult of personality and rally around the flag approach to leadership. We see this success reflected in many right-wing leaders ranging from Mussolini to Hitler to Le Pen to Trump. However, despite the cults of unity inspired by such individuals, we must practice caution in our naming conventions when distinguishing ultra-nationalism from fascism.  

Benoist claimed that fascism may reappear in society with “another name, another face.” So can we consider the ND the second coming of fascism? According to fascist experts Allardyce and Paxton, maybe not. Contemporary historians have defined fascism as: 

1. The revolt of the masses
2. The moral crisis of civilization
3. Totalitarianism
4. Modernization process

The May 1968 developments in France certainly give strong reason for checking boxes one and two. However, despite the characterization of the ND movement as a right-wing Conservative Revolution, the last two points are a bit more difficult to sell. On this distinction, I agree with academics like Wegierski and Sacchi: while the core values of the ND were certainly very right-leaning, experts like Allardyce and Paxton are right to confine fascism as a term to describe the political movements from 1919-1945 exclusively, no matter how tempting it may be to do otherwise. 

When describing the aims of GRECE (the ND’s principle think tank), Bar-On highlights how reimagining the ideology of the ultra-nationalist movements away from ethnic concepts of the nation and militaristic expansion was one of the goals of Benoist and the ND. This account pokes holes in the arguments made by Griffin linking the ND to fascist ideologies. As noted in Griffin’s colourful introduction, such connections are a bit of a stretch, and not widely accepted in academia.  

Marchi attributes the success of the spread of the ND school of thought across Europe in part to leaders’ ability to shape the ND agenda to their own political strategy. This thinking links back to our previous class discussions on gender and sexuality in authoritarian regimes: homosexuality was permitted and even encouraged in the Soviet Gulags while at the same time being outlawed in broader society; homosexuals were further persecuted in Nazi Germany, but lesbians were able to survive under the radar. In both these cases, leaders shaped nationalist ideologies to suit their particular needs.

In the example of the ND, it is reasonable to assume that right-wing leaders across Europe were not attracted to embracing all aspects of the ideology. It appears their support of the ND can be attributed to their interest in the legitimacy associated with labeling a political movement, be it the ND of 1968 or fascism from 1919-1945. In cases like this, we are reminded of the importance of defining terms, as these labels tend to stick without regard for their accuracy. 

Just as with Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany, we can track the development of a distinct culture alongside the Nouvelle Droite (ND). Culture became not only a means of disseminating the messages of the ND and bolstering it, but also came to define the movement. An examination of the culture of the ND reveals the ambiguity between nationalism and transnationalism in the ND. One way we can maybe think about this is the way that ND movements throughout Europe refashion a culture of the ND that is both relevant and useful their own countries while being deeply pan-European.

In all four readings from this week, the importance of media loomed large. Journals were a particularly important cultural artifact in several ND movements throughout Europe. In the Portuguese case, several journals emerged as a space to engage in dialogues about Portugal’s political future post Estado Novo (New State) and were a way to gain support for the ND in Portugal. Journals like Política which is especially interesting for its interdisciplinary nature and invocation of science. It was not only the production of journals that helped to bolster the ND throughout European countries but also the role of specific journalists like Gilberte Comte as mentioned in Roger Griffin’s article: “Between Metapolitics and Apoliteia: The Nouvelle Droite’s Strategy for Conserving the Fascist Vision in the ‘Interregnum.’” Indeed, journalists like Gilberte Comte can be seen as making important contributions to the development of the ND having published articles like “Une nouvelle droite?”

Moreover, writers like Julius Evola played an indispensable role in the development of a culture of the ND in Italy. Evola played an important role in defining the sense of traditionalism that the ND would lean on in the future. In particular, tradition as a belief in a sacred order governed by the ruling class of priests and elites. Stories and beliefs like this reconciled the decadence of the present with the belied that a new world order was coming. 

It is important to address the “so what?” question that emerged with the theme of a distinct culture of the ND. The complicated, and somewhat paradoxical ways, that ND movements in different countries developed a culture that was both nationalists and transnational was important in managing perceived threats. Namely, by creating and perpetuating rigid notions of culture, these movements could manage the threats that immigration brought which something we are very much still witnessing.

Usually during writing responses, I refrain from using first person pronouns, but I will reverse my stance for this week for the issues I had with this reading. Colloquial radical terrorism can find 9/11 at its nucleus. I argue that these violent acts do not “decentre” the West as most academia and media not only suggests but is obsessive and compulsive with perpetuating. 9/11 as a contemporary focal point was a product of systemic conflict within a Western conflict (consider the Soviet-Afghan proxy war) and less so a product of religion. While acts of violence in the name of Islam are conclusively indefensible, the framework of this article considers Islam to be part of a destabilizing force of Western, and in this context European, structures.

We can observe a divide from a series of pivotal events: pre- and post-WWII, pre and post-the collapse of the Soviet Union and the destruction of the Berlin Wall, and pre- and post-9/11. The focus on the collapse of the Berlin Wall is cited as symbolic for radical European change. From indiscriminate indiscrimination to collective unity (negative to positive groupism) in the face of public political unrest on massive scales, the use of Berlin Wall to mobilize a collective force was a revolution that, at the time, was unparalleled. However, the author uses the fall of the wall to both literally and figuratively break the levee between a homogenous Judeo-Christian European religious structure to a more inclusive and intersectional landscape. Quite obviously, two dominant faiths does not equate to coexisting. The author uses terminology that in a post-Holocaust society insinuates that pre- and post-Nazis was overwhelmingly and unflinchingly Christian-Catholic. The breaking levee and subsequent introduction of Islam through immigration had the author states that “Europe is a notion elaborated via the power of modernity and colonialism; in the present it also refers to a project of union that is being implemented by Europeans themselves.” This is somewhat implicit that Islam is being viewed as a colonial force, which is unfair – European powers dismantled and imposed by force religious and cultural values. The employment of the phrase “anachronism” places Islam into a primitive or antiquated context. The general practical application of scripture versus the ignorant notion that all billion Muslims are out for violence and radicalism. This is inherently problematic and blatantly false. The author presents the idea of integration is what is destabilizing Europe and its social, political, and economic structures.

If I am writing this both with my opinion and with my truth, I could not understand why the author, only 10 pages in, was contextualized to suggest that Islam is a threat. Europe has also been presented as the centre. Eurocentric ideology is equally as problematic as the purview that Islam is evil. Europe has been centralized through systematic campaigns of violence and oppression on a global scale across the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Europe has in itself decentralized the world – how can the overarching dichotomy of Islam in scholarship consistently revert back to how this and more broadly speaking other minority groups be an intervening malicious force? Göle is correct in suggesting that “we need to renew our ways of thinking and change our perspective on Europe, seeing it not as an autonomous and self-centered entity …” however their assertion that Islam exists to decentralize a current world order implies that the current world order promotes a utopia, which, when observing the systemic European sociopolitical structure is definitively not.

1968 has been a pivotal year for many European countries. The “Red” tide that was threatening Western Europe became the detonator for the rise of neo-fascist movements both in Italy and France. This transnational event which expansion all over Western Europe transformed the political landscape, found its origins in universities and youth movements.

In Italy, the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) which transitionally associated with the communists, broke away after 1968 and set itself as an all right-wing party with the intention to be more attractive and national. However, the association with the Destra Nazionale (DN) and its attraction to revive the fascist party, led to violence and terrorism in the 1970s.

In France, the newly decolonization of Algeria was resented as a failure and partisans of French Algeria favoured the creation of neo-fascist and anti-communist movements such as Occident and la Féderation des Etudiants Nationalistes (FEN). The creation of the New Order (Ordre Nouveau) and the influence of Alain de Benoist and the GRECE collaboration (Groupement de Recherche et d’Etudes pour la Civilisation Européenne) contributed to the creation of a new rightist culture.

The similarity of thoughts that was in France and Italy spread to Portugal during the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution. The influence of De Benoist was visible with the participation of intellectuals and the publication of numerous magazines and books which used scientific methods to demonstrate the inadequacy of egalitarian Marxist societies.

What Portugal and France had in common was a struggle to overcome post-colonialism and the creation of a New Right allowed a more powerful political presence that rejected the two superpowers in place at that time in order to favour a European path. Using immigration as a scapegoat, the idea of nationality and traditions laid the path for a transnational movement that substantiates itself through ideas and culture.

What transpires from these readings is the departure from rigid and old-fashioned regimes toward the creation of political movements that foster on deception and protests to present an alternative path that supports traditional values and which goal is to appeal to mass population. But, is there really a new path with new ideas or are these ideas more the antithesis of older ones ? Can the New Right rally enough people without digging too deep in a dark past ?

Works cited :

Tamir Bar-On, “Transnationalism and the French Nouvelle Droite.” Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 45, no. 3 (July 2011): 199–223.

Andrea Mammon, “The Transnational Reaction to 1968: Neo-Fascist Fronts and Political Cultures in France and Italy.” Contemporary European History, vol. 17, no. 2 (May 2008): 213–236.

Riccard Marchi, “The Nouvelle Droite in Portugal: A New Strategy for the Radical Right in the Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy.” Patterns of Prejudice vol. 50, no. 3 (July 2016): 232–52.

Tamir Bar-On’s Idea of the “multiculturalism of the new right” is a concept that I found particularly interesting. It also reminds me of the discussion that we had a few weeks back about the use and manipulation of other countries by Hitler in David Motadel’s The Global Authoritarian Moment and the Revolt against Empire. An example being the use of British anti-colonial sentiments in other countries to mobilize them for the German Reich, but to do this for the liberation of their own country. This seems very similar to the Nouvelle Droite’s (ND) “multiculturalism of the new right,” as it focus on the differentness of different regions, and countries in their attempt to spread their ideas transnationally. It is interesting to see how these concepts in a way overlap, and much like Roger Griffen points out in his article, the similarities and ideas of German Fascism that the ND draws from.

Bar-On’s writes that the post war there was an increase in the popularity of left-wing politics. This is something that Alain de Benoist, the leader of ND, drew upon to further his goal of spreading this transnational “multiculturalism of the new right.”  He would use the tactics that the new left would use in spreading this goal. de Benoist was vocal about being anti-fascist, he would use terms such as “multiculturalism of the new right,” because he did not want to be connected with the ultra-nationalism of the German Reich, it was seen as “politically correct”. To push this idea that they were not associated with their concepts, but they were choosing their wording specifically to appeal to the promotion of the new right.

It is through these readings on can see the way in which the general conception of politics, and the political landscape of the times shifts the way that the ND present their ideology, in their attempt to promote this idea of transnationalism. This is quite evident in Griffen’s article. It makes one wonder the about the validity of perceived political dichotomies, but also about the how this notion of “political correctness” is used today? How does the ND’s understanding of political correctness differ from modern conceptions of what it means to be politically correct, what is the etymology?

The new Right movements have started to rise again similarly to how they first rose in the late 60s. Their influence is of a transnational reach, which is interesting as the movement itself is grounded on ultra-nationalistic ideology. Based on a chosen national identity, it is interesting that it is also considered transnational because, as Tamil Bar-On writes, identity is often not paired with only one nation, but a panoply of them. We can point back to the conversation we had quite a few weeks ago about Fascism and internationalism and say that like fascism, the new right knows the importance of internationalism as a pragmatic approach to realizing its goals and getting support. Also, Riccardo Marchi points out that the failure of some of the new right movements in Europe reflects a lack of interest from the population because of a lack of media attention. Media attention, which is surely as national as it is international, is in fact part of that transnational outreach. In the age of media and information, it is interesting to see how influential the media is in shifting the political stage. Could we imagine certain political personalities of this age having taken the position they have now without media attention? Another question one might ask is how much media is influencing the political stage, nationally and globally? Even at the beginning of the new right movements in France or Portugal, how much could we accord the formation of these movements to information circulation? This is considering the fact that these movements were born from pulling numerous ideological concepts from a multiplicity of other states, making the movement very transnational. So, what to make of the importance of the media in the creation of these movements and is there really a national identity or are we simply circling back to the idea of a new man by creating a national identity?

By Alex Wittmann

The 1960s was a time of social change globally. There were student demonstrations and massive protests in the United States as part of a backlash to Vietnam. In Europe there were was the creation of a new left as a response to traditional establishment governments, as shown in the article Not Narrating the History of the Federal Republic, there were leftist demonstrations against the conservative West German establishment. The article Transnational Reaction to 1968: Neo-Fascist Fronts and Political Cultures in France and Italy highlights the fact that there were right wing movements in Italy and France culminating in 1968 that were related. The article shows that right wing cultural activism and historical movements such as the rise of right wing militants are not always regulated to a country’s borders. The right wing reactionary movements creating the Movimento Sociale Italiano heavily influenced the creation of the National Front in France as an example. The article identifies that in the late 1960s, there existed a hegemony of leftism in Europe. Culminating from student movements to the communist governments in place in Eastern Europe. The question was, where did the right fit in. The article mentions how right wing movements in France and Italy, as a backlash to leftism defended traditional principles of colonialism. The 1960s was a time of rapid decolonization and the French right articulated whatever it could in order to hold onto its traditional empire. The anti immigrant rhetoric used by the far right movements in both France and Italy is also not dissimilar to the populist playbook that is articulated from Europe’s right today. This anti immigrant rhetoric was shared between right wing movements in both France and Italy. In this sense we can equate the events of 1968 to today when right wing populist movements across Europe are interconnected in their fear and resentment of immigration. It is interesting to see how European right wing movements were interconnected in 1968 much to the same way they are interconnected today.

Source Cited:

Andrea Mammon, “The Transnational Reaction to 1968: Neo-Fascist Fronts and Political Cultures in France and Italy.” Contemporary European History, vol. 17, no. 2 (May 2008): 213–236.