The use of Tourism and Symbols as a way to Propagandize the Romanticized Version of Far Right Extremism, and Why it’s Appealing

Written by Emma Bronsema

In the 1960s, tourism was used as a way to propagandize political agendas. Film and souvenirs in this industry showed the supposed developments and improvements of the Spanish nation under Franco. They were used as a way to justify his rule and ideology. Appearance and perception was everything. The usage of symbolism and actions found within material objects, film and music was, and continues to be, a way to advertise identity traits to which one should aspire to. It congregates like-minded people, and fosters a sense of community and meaning. Not only are these objects reflections of identity, but have the power to shape it, and frame the way people think and act. 

In the context of right wing extremism, the symbols found on material goods brings together people who share a romanticized version of fascism. Rather than focusing on the marginalization and lack in certain civic rights, people yearn for a patriotized, nationalistic version of the past – for a society that painted itself to be full of opportunity, freedom, prosperity, and ran efficiently.  Although there are different fascist groups, they can work in tandem with one another. This includes participation in protests and movements to which the members have close ties and similarities to those in the other group. 

For some, these extremist groups provide people with a sense of community, a home where they are surrounded with people with similar ideologies. There is a social side of fascism. Some tourists even travel to interact and develop relationships with these people who have similar views. For others, it is a way for some to climb a social ladder, a way for them to become popular and almost a celebrity within their world. Often it has to do with memorabilia they have, or shrines with specific pictures and symbols they displayed. Lastly, these groups provide a way to justify and express their disagreement with the current state of their nation. It validates their seemingly unpopular opinion, as it goes against mainstream thought and politics.

Works Cited

Shelley Baranowski, Strength through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 1-10, pp. 162-98 

Justin Crumbaugh, “Prosperity and Freedom Under Franco: the Grand Invention of Tourism” in Destination Dictatorship: the Spectacle of Spain’s Tourist Boom and the Reinvention of Difference (SUNY Press, 2009), pp. 15-41. 

Cynthia Miller-Idris, “The Extreme Gone Mainstream” IIITMedia lecture, May 2018 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QHYcakSDUCE 

Inside Spain’s Fascism Fandom https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sqKSXPiGe7U

Leisure and Tourism in Nazi Germany

By: Andreea Gustin

This week’s sources provided a look at fascism from a perspective I had never considered. When thinking of fascism and what made people go along with it, my mind always instantly went to things like force, brutality, harsh restrictions etc. Never did I really consider how tourism or leisure could act as a form of propaganda to appeal to the masses and gain popular consent. Obviously, it is not to say that most people supported fascist regimes during this time, however, as can be seen in sources like Shelly Baranowski’s Strength through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich, the Third Reich and the Kraft durch Freude (KdF) were able to weaponize leisure and tourism in order to persuade citizens to think that the regime had improved their lives and to further the narrative of German superiority. 

This source showcases how leisure activities and tourism were used to create this idealistic image of leadership under the Nazi regime and internally as well as externally create a sense of German nationalism. Hitler’s regime wanted to give German travellers and those travelling from other countries a look at “Aryan superiority”. However, in reality this was an illusion to make it appear as through their living conditions and lifestyles were of a higher level. After having read this week’s sources, it becomes easier to understand why to some, there may have been some sort of appeal in regards to fascism that went beyond ideology. Leisure and travel were instrumentalized to achieve wider Nazi goals and to create a sense of normality in a way to manufacture and maintain popular consent. 

The Culture of Fascism

By Sydney Linholm

Shelley Baranowski’s article Strength Through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich investigates the connection between the Nazi regime and mass consumerism, and how this created a controversy surrounding the Hitler movement. The author discusses how the Nazi party was skeptical of the socialist and American routes to raising living standards through consumption, and instead pushed for mass production to ensure Hitler’s vision of material abundance despite the party’s suspicion of consumption. This discriminated against consumer production and curtailed imports of consumer goods. When thinking about the Third Reich as a fascist regime, this is a classic example of its classification as such because of this phenomena that mass production would ensure material abundance and subsequent continental domination, and in doing so, purposefully rejecting the socialist idea of consumption to increase living standards.

Additionally, it is interesting to look at this when also thinking about Germany as a dominant global power in the 20th century because of the way that the idea of mass production influencing material abundance influencing continental domination functions with the idea of hegemony. Maybe I am just too much of a political science student, but this idea that having material power will directly influence having global power is similar to the realist idea of hegemony, which has a tendency to focus on the material component of hegemonic power and less so on the wilful exercise of leadership component of the theory. This is interesting because of realism’s connections with realpolitik, which was not unseen within Hitler’s regime. This is not to say that realism is an inherently fascist ideology: I am simply making a connection between the realist idea of hegemonic power and Hitler’s belief that material abundance will provide him with global power.

The Culture of Fascism

Sara Dix

It’s interesting how there is more emphasis on the brutality of fascist regimes in history, but the aspect of “leisure” and “tourism” as a form of propaganda is rarely discussed. Baranowski’s article focuses on the organization, Strength Through Joy, during the Nazi regime as a way to build a racial utopia with German tourists. This goes the same for Spain during the 1960s, as Crumbaugh explains.

The Strength Through Joy organization’s goal was to improve the living standards for Germans until living space was achieved. So, it provided leisure activities for people of various as a way to compensate for the wage freezes, longer working hours, and restrictions on private consumption by the German government. Tourism for this organization was an “attempt to create a non-Marxist, non-Fordist, and characteristically Nazi mode of consumption” (Baranowski). This was similar in Spain during the 1960s and it was a form of propaganda that created a sense of normalcy against the background of fascist brutality. The Strength Through Joy organization needed to boost productivity among Germans, but it also enforced the idea of a “master race” by bringing tourists into countries that were doing poorly, such as Italy, and those that were doing well, such as Nordic countries.

Crumbaugh explains that tourism was a device for Spain that includes “the modes of representation associated with both bureaucracy and commercialism” (Crumbaugh). The film he discusses shows that the tourism trope operates as an “invention necessary for its own (re)production” (Crumbaugh). In 1951, the Ministry of Info and Tourism (MIT) was created with the idea that tourism was not just for economic means, but to collect information. This ministry was used to promote a relatively normal and pleasurable environment to cover up a violent government that did not tolerate any liberal freedoms.

Works Cited

Justin Crumbaugh, “Prosperity and Freedom Under Franco: the Grand Invention of
Tourism” in Destination Dictatorship: the Spectacle of Spain’s Tourist Boom and the
Reinvention of Difference (SUNY Press, 2009), pp. 15-41.

Shelley Baranowski, Strength through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third
Reich (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 1-10, pp. 162-98

Weaponizing Cultural Fascism: How Tourism Enabled the Fascist Myth for the Contemporary Far-Right

By Bryce Greer

Vice’s report “Inside Spain’s Fascism Fandom” is eye-opening in the portrayal of Francoism in the contemporary period. Shocking the most was the inclusion of Chen, a Chinese immigrant and Franquista, who after being asked about how he, as an immigrant, would have been treated under Franco’s regime, replied: “Of course. In Spain, in Franco’s time, nobody lived badly.” On the contrary, Franco’s regime saw the use of violence, repression, and assisted in the use of concentration camps, executing immigrants and other marginalized communities that did not fit in his nationalist picture for Spain. It is clear, then, that the contemporary far-right sees a spectacle of 20th century fascism that acts as a veneer over its atrocious histories. The fear should be spread to such idea of a weaponized cultural fascism, one deep-rooted in its use of tourism.

Justin Crumbaugh noted that in the 1960s, the Franco regime restyled itself around its economics, attempting to project a positive identification onto its government. After being one of the few remaining Fascist leaders, this restyle came through the form of consumerist tourism, one that created an impression that it took a collective Spanish population to develop. Hence, tourism created a sense of a Spanish identity, the economic boom led to the soft dictatorial rule, and yet still fascist. Its combination of tourism to information, through films, newsreels, etc., led to a popular appeal to the Franco regime, one that brought Spain to its rightful glory. The created Spanish myth of an economically stable Spain across all classes was brought forward by tourism, yet the beaches of Spain did not look the same as the common village on the regime’s margins. Clear then, was the weaponizing of tourism alongside the culture of fascism to create a sense of a good past, one that leaves the contemporary with a nostalgia to the regime’s claimed glory. Fundamentally, Crumbaugh left me wondering about the margins, but perhaps the similarities to Nazi Germany’s Strength Through Joy (KdF) can answer it.

While Chen claimed that “you can’t put Franco together with Hitler” and that they have different stories, I found the same narrative he holds nostalgia for in Franco’s regime had similar popular appeal in Nazi Germany’s KdF. In its own form of tourism, KdF created the impression of a harmonized class and a united racial community for Germans. Through photographs, and by using undercover surveillance, KdF was able to give to the desires of the working class. On the local level, however, the complaints saw the marginalized communities continue to suffer. There was disunity in social statuses with class tension revealed through the different attitudes given to KdF tourists as opposed to private tourists. Yet, as an organization, it survived through its interplay with propaganda, like the Franco regime.

In the end, I am still left wondering how tourism became used by fascist groups to create a now contemporary nostalgia, however, to explain people like Chen and other far-right individuals, stability through the fabrication of tourism can easily create a spectacle in belief of a return to what they would call “good.”

Works Cited:

Shelley Baranowski, Strength through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third
Reich (Cambridge, 2004)

Justin Crumbaugh, “Prosperity and Freedom Under Franco: the Grand Invention of
Tourism” in Destination Dictatorship: the Spectacle of Spain’s Tourist Boom and the
Reinvention of Difference (SUNY Press, 2009)

Vice International, “Inside Spain’s Fascism Fandom,” Vice. YouTube (Sept. 17th 2020). Accessed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sqKSXPiGe7U

The Shortcomings of Kraft durch Freude and of Baranowski

By: WIllem Nesbitt

With the return of Germany to the world stage in the 1930s, this time under the leadership of the Nazi regime, the Nazi’s sought to establish the German people as superior, strong, and Ayran, both internally and externally. Whether through the flexing of athletic might at the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin, or, as seen in Shelley Baranowski’s Strength Through Joy, through establishing nationalist, Ayran ideals via vacations for workers to other countries, the Nazi regime wished to validate their alternative to American “Fordism” and Soviet leftism.

            For all of the seemingly self-proclaimed bravado of the Nazi organization Kraft durch Freude established within Baranowski’s introduction, Chapter 5 paints KdF in a different light, one that I feel the author failed to conclude into a potentially interesting point on the organization and thereby the regime, despite spending most of the chapter discussing it. Baranowski relays stories of KdF tourists displeased with their accommodations and experiences, ranging from being upset over being poured a lesser quality coffee, to Westphalian and Silesian KdF tourists nearly coming to blows over some name-calling, and at one point, states that KdF customers were served “a one-course dish to keep [the restauranteur’s] costs in line with KdF’s reimbursement for the meal” (page 166). This single line, of which Baranowski quickly moves on from to discuss class and racial issues within KdF tours, alludes to the potential fact that KdF and the Nazi regime were falling short. If the intention for this program was to both show foreigners the successes of the German people and to teach the workers who went on these trips that their work was resulting in a successful and prosperous nation, then most surely their meals should have been at the very least equivalent to those of the “private” tourists Baranowski contrasts the KdF tourists with. Although the author makes this point, they fail to further extract an argument from it, one such as that the KdF organization was potentially underfunded, or that, like many other endeavours by the Nazi regime, KdF was simply mismanaged and too brash in its intentions, unable to hold up its promises. For all the interesting anecdotes and insights of Baranowski’s writing, they seem to fail to coalesce these points into a tangible argument, leaving the reader wanting for a more satisfying conclusion.

Spying, Leisure, and Subversion: How the ‘Strength Through Joy’ Program Could Have Worked Against the Nazi Reich

By Austin Pellizzer

In the mid-1930s, with the Nazi regime’s economic, social, and political atmosphere being stronger and prosperous than ever, offering its citizens an opportunity to travel outside its borders became a new and exciting experience for many of Germany’s own. Shelley Baranowski’s article, Strength Through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich, sheds light on the phenomena of how freedom and state surveillance can work hand-in-hand. In 1936, with much of the state coming under suspicion and paranoia of its citizens working to undermine its National Socialist goals (162-63), the world of state surveillance and across-class leisure converged into one (164). These trips were a way for Hitler’s regime to present the myth of Aryan superiority even in the allied nations such as Italy and Portugal (192). The goal of attempting to portray the German Reich as superior in living standards for all citizens (165) demonstrated how the Reich was steadfast in giving the illusion of order and superiority. 

With this generally popular program coming to an end due to the start of World War Two, Baranowski leaves one question wanting and without explanation. To what extent (if at any) did subversive and anti-governmental actions through espionage or other anti-Nazi networks work within this international sphere? Did said networks exist in a broader context? if they did, how did they manage?. While I understand how state-sponsored leisure and international programs would be closely monitoring its members actions, it would be interesting to see if any working-class people who Baranowski notes as having a prone attitude to supporting marxism (195) would have attempted to push back against the state. Lastly, as we see in the later war years, underground networks were a key facet which aided the downfall of this fascist regime across Europe. However, the question is, when did it all start?

Works Cited

Shelley Baranowski, Strength through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the ThirdReich(Cambridge, 2004), pp. 1-10, pp. 162-98

PR in fascism

The videos about the Spanish fandom of Franco’s fascism and German clothes symbolizing the ideas of the extreme far-right showed a contemporary cultural and even emotional attachment to far-right movements including fascism in Germany and Spain, to the point where it seems like the participants or rather the ones that spread it are willingly ignoring the atrocities committed under the name of fascism, so that only a romanticized side of the ideology is diffused. A nostalgia, not unlike the one associated with the good sides of communism remembered by the older generation of East European countries, appears to emanate. Acts of dressing with German clothing brands that bring to the fore elements of the fascist Nazi ideology such as the purity of the race, or of going to a café dedicated to the dictator Franco, or to participate in a commemoration of him, can be interpretated as a way to put forth the old iconic symbols of the movement to bring back the same fervor it enjoyed years ago, and maybe voluntarily only focusing on the components that serve the actual resurgences (such as the anti-immigration stance) and putting aside the former extreme actions (concentration camps).

German fascism in the 1930s and then Spanish fascism in the 1960s employed similar tactics of propaganda to try and create craze among the population, as discussed by the articles on tourism. It is interesting to note the different approaches of the two countries. Baranovski’s article depicts cruises organized by the Nazi party destined to the workers in order to promote, and kind of present to the local population of the countries visited, the German nation as a united one. In this line of thought, there were efforts in order for the passengers to mingle in ships apparently devoid of social segregation, or at least tentatively hidden. The reality said otherwise, as people stayed with others from their native region, and Party members and people from different hierarchical backgrounds behaved accordingly and had access to privileges. This traveling enabled Germans to witness for themselves their racial superiority compared to other populations, and in a public representation way, to showcase it, in an environment of propaganda where leisure and enjoyment were reserved to the ones reaching the racial standards, and the ones below were deprived of it. The analysis of German photographs of Umbach supports this comparison between people, as Germans are pictured in advantageous ways and other population are captured in lazy moments for example. These kinds of photographs also support the idea of presenting fascism in a good and positive way, which aligns with today’s romanticizing of it.

While Germans traveled outside, Franco’s Spain brought tourists in, as explained by Crumbaugh’s article. The positive image of the country was meant to be achieved by tourist coming in to visit, and the fact that people could travel was meant to show that there was freedom under the regime. The goal was to instill a sense of national pride that only fascism could bring, as with Germany. As recent (but pre-pandemic) protests against mass tourism in Barcelona happen (see https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexledsom/2019/07/12/barcelona-is-ready-to-shut-out-tourists/?sh=4c3d940f5546), one can conclude with a stretch that maybe the job was done and carried on a little too well and Spain ended up victim to its own campaign of promoting tourism!

On an amusing side note, the German fascist cruises show that surveillance by infiltration was not exclusively a feature of the communist regimes as they are well known for! Clearly all political regimes need inside informers and some got lucky and ended up with a paid vacation.

Works cited:

Shelley Baranowski, Strength through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the ThirdReich(Cambridge, 2004), pp. 1-10, pp. 162-98

Justin Crumbaugh, “Prosperity and Freedom Under Franco: the Grand Invention of Tourism” in Destination Dictatorship: the Spectacle of Spain’s Tourist Boomand the Reinvention of Difference (SUNY Press, 2009), pp.15-41.

Maiken Umbach, “Selfhood, Place, and Ideology in GermanPhoto Albums, 1933-1945” Central European History Vol. 48, Special Issue 3 (Photography and Twentieth-Century German History): 335-365.

Cynthia Miller-Idris, “The Extreme Gone Mainstream” IIITMedia lecture, May 2018https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QHYcakSDUCE

Inside Spain’s Fascism Fandom https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sqKSXPiGe7U

Watchin’ the Tide Roll Away?

By Absalom Sink

It’s becoming a tiresome cliché, isn’t it? Almost as tiresome as the cliché from a few years ago: that of a ‘rising tide of far-right populism’ in Europe. And while that old number is still getting plenty of play, it seems like every month there’s a handful of new articles and op-eds pontificating on whether the ‘populist tide’ has peaked and begun to ebb.

To be fair, I can understand the urge behind writing pieces like those. The ‘populist right’ has been dealt a number of blows this year. There was the “stunning rebuke” against populism in Slovakia with the election of centre-left, liberal Zuzana Caputova. Just over a week ago in Bologna, Italy, a rally held by the populist Matteo Salvini and attended by a little under 6000 supporters was counter-protested by between 12000 and 15000 people. Similarly, far-right rallies held last week by Pegida in Dresden and the ultranationalist NPD in Hannover were dwarfed by counter-protesters. And it’s hard not to see 13500 people marching in Paris against Islamophobia as a raised middle finger aimed at the Rassemblement National (RN), the political embodiment of Islamophobia in France. Finally, let’s not forget the “collapse of the far-right” in the Austrian election this past September, when the FPO lost 10% of the overall vote as compared to the last election because of a corruption scandal.

The problem is when we try to use events like these to extrapolate out over the whole of Europe. In fact, just framing it as the populist right is problematic. Certainly, there are transnational connections between populist movements/parties, but there is no single, monolithic populism. These groups cooperate to the extent that it’s practical. But if, say, Germany’s AfD were to suddenly founder, it’s a fair bet that the Swiss Peoples’ Party and the RN and the Sweden Democrats—far-right populists, all—would let them sink before risking their own positions. By lumping all these groups together when declaring that the ‘populist tide is receding’, we massively oversimply a complex transnational political situation.

Aside from oversimplifying things, there’s also the worry that such statements might make voters complacent; believing the threat to be behind them, voters might have less impetus to vote. The problem is a number of far-right populist parties in Europe still have fairly robust polling numbers. Germany’s AfD has held steady at 13-14% in the national polls for two years, while in Thuringia’s state election last month it came second, with over 23% of the vote. In France, Marine Le Pen’s RN is actually leading the presidential poll, hovering around 28%. Even in Austria, where the ‘Ibiza affair’ saw the FPÖ drop by 10% in the last election, they picked up enough seats that they were able to maintain their coalition government with the winning ÖVP. How can we claim that far-right populism has peaked when a party like the ‘formerly’ fascist Sweden Democrats are poised to become the biggest party in their country, and could conceivably with the 2022 election?

My point in all of this is simply that journalists and political observers alike should be wary of making sweeping declarations on the state of far-right populism. Europe is bigger and more diverse than we sometimes recognize; when we’re talking about an entire continent, it’s worth remembering that high tide happens at different times in Helsinki, Finland and Cadiz, Spain. The same goes for the metaphorical tide. While populism might ebb in one region, it can still be in flood in another.

Europe’s Radical Right: Cultural Descendant of the Nouvelle Droite

By Absalom Sink

Two weeks ago, we read and discussed the rise of the Nouvelle Droite (ND), first in France, and then in a broader, pan-European context. Crucial to the formulation of the ND was its retreat from the political arena into the realm of culture, the realm of “metapolitics”. Seeing in the protests of 1968 the sway that the Left held over cultural institutions—particularly institutions of higher education—far right figures led by Alain de Benoist ostensibly abandoned politics and moved instead to open up cultural space in which later generations of Far Right thinkers and politicians might act; they appropriated from the Left Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, and worked to sow the seeds of a counterhegemonic bloc.

From this week’s readings, I would argue that the experiment is something of a qualified success. Certainly, most of today’s so-called Radical Right1 have not taken up de Benoist’s neopagan ritualism. And the populist, self-described “democratic” nature of Radical Right movements is inherently contrary to the ND’s anti-democratic, elitist formulation. But as the readings make clear, there are crucial threads linking the ND and the Radical Right. Chief among them is ethnopluralism. As Ina Schmidt explains, “Ethnopluralism is an ideology of the far right, which is no longer directed against foreign ethnicities, but rather against cultures—understood as being irrevocably connected with certain values, practices, and habits.” Essentially, it is a form of cultural racism, as opposed to the biological racism of yore, popular with fascists. By shifting the focus of their xenophobia from “race” to “culture”, Radical Right groups avoid the charge of racism and open ideological space between themselves and fascist forebears. It’s the ideological sleight of hand that lets Islamophobes respond to charges of racism with the stock sentence “Islam isn’t a race!” And as we’ll recall from Tamir Bar-On’s article, it is the same semantic shift that de Benoist and his followers made in the 1980s, moving from biological racism to the anti-multicultural “Europe of a Hundred Flags”.

It does not really matter that groups like Pegida or the Front National don’t adhere entirely to the roadmap laid down by the ND. Remember, the goal of the ND was simply to create the cultural space in which Far Right ideals might be taken once more into the political sphere—ideals like the abandonment of liberal democracy, and at least since the 1980s, of ethnopluralism over multiculturalism. By achieving broader cultural acceptance, as evinced by de Benoist’s Prix de l’essai from l’Académie Française and glowing coverage in Telos, the ND was able to open that political space it desired. It now needed political actors to take up the mantle. As both Zack Beauchamp—in his interview with our old friend Cas Mudde—and Pietro Castelli Gattinara show, a series of events in 2015 would provide the spark for an explosion of Radical Right movements to occupy that space, a sort of Far Right Big Bang.

According to Mudde, “the core of the ideology of the radical right includes three features: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.” Nativism, he says, is essentially a form of xenophobia that dictates that a state should only be inhabited by people who are “native” to it.2 Authoritarianism revolves around the belief that society should be “strictly ordered”, and in which any social issue becomes treated as an issue of security—the example Mudde gives here is the treatment of drug crises as “something to be cracked down on” through law and order, rather than as a public health issue. Finally, populism boils down to another “us versus them” dichotomy, this time between “the elites”—typically mainstream political figures, but with a healthy helping of wealthy proponents of liberalism, like the far right’s bogeyman George Soros—and “the real people”.3 2015 brought a confluence of factors that served to empower nascent Radical Right movements throughout Europe. First, the refugee crisis, stoked nativist fears throughout Europe. Terror attacks, starting with Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015, fueled authoritarian tendencies and calls for increased vigilance, particularly against ‘outsiders.’ Finally, the lingering effects of the 2008 financial crisis and the aftershocks that threatened the structural integrity of the EU undermined the existing economic liberal order and played into populist anti-elitist rhetoric.

Julius Evola knew he would never see a truly resurgent fascism in his lifetime; it is entirely possible that Alain de Benoist never thought he’d see the ideological seeds he sowed bear fruit. But a series of external shocks—a financial crisis originating in the United States, revolutions throughout the Middle East leading to a nearly decade-long civil war in Syria, the rise of ISIL, and the largest refugee crisis since the Bosnian War—provided the cover for a broad range of Radical Right political movements to spring up in the cultural niche carved out by the ND.

1Borrowing here from Cas Mudde’s differentiation between “Extreme Right” and “Radical Right”, in which the former rejects democracy outright in favour of revolution aiming for authoritarianism, while the latter merely rejects aspects of liberal democracy, like pluralism and minority rights, while still claiming to adhere to democratic principles. Castelli Gattinara helps to further clarify, explaining that radical right groups “locate themselves outside the political mainstream but without intending to replace democracy with an authoritarian order.”

2Remember, though, from our very first class, when we grappled with the question of “who is really ‘native’ to a given place?” The Magyar people claim ownership of Hungary, even though they are likely to have arrived significantly later that the ancestors of today’s Slovenes within the borders of Hungary. Likewise, how “native” is a person who calls themselves an “Anglo-Saxon”—itself an incredibly fraught term—to Britain?

3”The real people” has become something of a shibboleth for Far- and Radical Right groups, differentiating them from Left populists; as Jan Werner-Muller explains, the term serves to “other” any who don’t fit with the “majority”, while also delegitimizing any other groups and figures vying for power.

Works Cited:

Beauchamp, Zack. “An expert on the European far right explains the growing influence of anti-immigrant politics”. Vox. May 31, 2016 https://www.vox.com/2016/5/31/11722994/european-far-right-cas-mudde

Bar-On, Tamir. “Transnationalism and the French Nouvelle Droite.” Patterns of Prejudice 45, no. 3 (July 2011): 199–223.

Castelli Gattinara, Pietro. “Framing Exclusion in the Public Sphere: Far-Right Mobilisation and the Debate on Charlie Hebdo in Italy.” South European Society & Politics 22, no. 3 (Sept. 2017): 345–364.

Schmidt, Ina. “PEGIDA: A Hybrid Form of a Populist Right Movement.” German Politics & Society 35, no. 4 (Winter 2017): 105–17.

“The Dangers of Populism” Interview with Jan Werner Mueller, Council of Europe (March 2017) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ahtvsNU2bkk