Edward Said’s discourse of Orientalism is a productive lens through which to view the far right’s use of a racial ‘other’ in order to identify and consolidate the nation. For Said, the ‘Orient’ was a floating signifier, over-determined and malleable, that could be whatever the West needed it to be (Orientalism, 21). He also identified Orientalist discourse as drawing upon the tropes and vocabulary of the older European discourse of antisemitism. This similarity is made explicit in Hanebrink’s chapter on Judeo-Bolshevism, in which Jews are identified as the leaders of both international capitalist and Communist conspiracies (6), and the human manifestations of revolution (13). As the Jews killed Christ, therefore prefiguring the anti-Christ, so they defy borders, therefore becoming the anti-nation (8). Like Said’s ‘Orientals’, Jews in the twentieth century were a conveniently floating signifier. Bolshevism was a new threat. Jews were an old threat. Therefore, Bolshevism was Jewish (27). Motadel’s article makes clear the centrality of convenience in the application of racial policy, and the conceptual malleability of ‘the Jew’ was convenient because of its use in nation building. Hanebrink states that “Jews and Judaism gave coherence to a variety of cultural visions by suggesting what their inversion might look like” (28). What is the West? Not the Orient. What is any given ethnic national? Not a (cosmopolitan, Bolshevik) Jew. Jews also allowed a nation’s problems to be blamed on non-national actors. For example, Ben-Ghiat describes how Italy was able to use the Jew to replace the southern Italian as a scapegoat for Italian underachievement, a definite improvement from the perspective of nation building (154). A constructed racial ‘other’, it would seem, can be a nation’s best friend.
The Flexibility of Fascist Ideology – Internationalism by Lauren McCoy
After considering this week’s material, it feels like fascism’s relationship to internationalism is intentionally flexible, which allows it to make contradictory claims that benefit its national cause. When reading last week’s material on defining populism, one of the elements that stood out to me was the suggestion that populism lacks an ideology in it itself, instead attaching itself to existing political beliefs without disrupting them. At the time, I had assumed this lack of ideology is what separated populism and fascism, since fascists clearly have a strict, uncompromising worldview. While maybe fascism cannot camouflage itself quite as well as populism, in reflecting on this week’s reading I feel like fascism is much more flexible than I had previously thought. I think this flexibility may speak to how fascism is emotionally driven rather than ideologically, like other traditional political ideologies. Rather than conform their actions to an ideological framework, fascists create their own meaning for elements that support their movement. This allows them to be contradictory and shift their stance as they see fit, since an intellectual-base isn’t the source of their authority.
By extension then, I think fascist governments can maintain a contradictory stance toward internationalism without decreasing its validity because their ideology is so flexible. This allows for anti-internationalism and pro-internationalism views to exist within the same body of fascist thought, so long as both support the overall movement. Having a looming, existential international enemy in the form of Judeo-Bolshevism or liberal democracies is extremely effective in their fear-mongering, creating a single enemy for their national army to violently rally against in the creation of their nation. The Judeo-Bolshevism is especially good considering how variable interpretations of a supposed Jewish communist revolution have shifted dramatically, allowing each state to make its own specific claims and arguments that speak to their national circumstances while remaining tied to the overall antisemitic movement. At the same time, placing yourself in a global anti-liberal/antisemitic movement adds further validity to fascist “ideology” while providing the strategic benefit of allies (more support in the international system, resources, e.c.t.).
Fascism and Internationalism: Are they compatible? – Jacob Braun
Photo: A soldier of the Free Arabian Legion in German-occupied Greece, 1943
As far back as the aftermath of the First World War, groups of radical nationalists across Europe united to halt the revolutions sweeping across Russia and Germany, which they feared would spill over into their own countries. The idea of “Judeo-Bolshevism” would emerge in the interwar time period, serving as a justification for many devastating pogroms against Jews across the continent.
Radical nationalists of the 20th century would be found to collaborate with one another on tackling the threat of “Judeo-Bolshevism,” but would rarely see eye-to-eye concerning other issues on the grounds of ideological differences. “Judeo-Bolshevism” served as such a unifying target for these groups, as it was already a common ground for most Europeans; it was believed that Jews were the face of the [communist] revolutions of Europe, and had to be destroyed (Hanebrink 13). Radical nationalists yearned for the maintenance of the status quo of a conservative, christian Europe, denouncing any deviation from it as part of the Jewish conspiracy. For instance, upon the emergence of the Weimar Republic after the First World War, radical German nationalists named it the Judenrepublik, or “Jewish Republic” (Hanebrink 16).
Throughout history, it has been proven that as long as there is a unifying “evil” for nationalists to campaign against, cooperation is possible. Although internationalism is comparable to a cardinal sin for fascists, as long as it supports their personal goals such a grave transgression can be tolerated. In this case, consider the numerous international brigades fielded by the Third Reich during the Second World War. Taking advantage of anticolonial sentiments across their enemies’ territories, Nazi Germany was able to cooperate with sympathetic fighters in their struggles for a new world order (Motadel 843). However, the Reich’s fascist network of alliances conflicted too much to allow for further development of these groups because of their focus on subjugation instead of self-determination.
Cooperation between fascism and internationalism is not impossible. People need a common enemy to be willing to fight together, and looking back through history to find one is usually a predictable first step. Although whenever these alliances are made, one can expect them not to last long; at some point, pragmatic cooperation between nationalists will outlive its usefulness and competition will arise.
Works Cited
Hanebrink, Paul A. A Specter Haunting Europe: The Myth of Judeo-Bolshevism. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018, pp. 1-45.
Motadel, David. “The Global Authoritarian Moment and the Revolt against Empire.” The American Historical Review, vol. 124, no. 3, 2019, pp. 843-877.
Photo courtesy of the German Bundesarchiv.
Connecting the Far-Right to Internationalism
Before delving into the readings, my understanding of Internationalism is that it encompasses the idea that states/nations should have greater political and/or economic cooperation amongst each other. With that in mind, how do the readings explore how the far-right has a connection to internationalism? The Hanebrink reading points out that “Across Europe, neofascists similar in age and outlook to white nationalists in America rally to defend their “own” culture against the forces of globalism, which they associate with Jews.” (Hanebrink, p. 2) Working with this, it would be reasonable to say that rallying transnationally across state and national boundaries under a common viewpoint could be considered internationalist, by nature of seeking greater political cooperation. However by that same logic, if neoliberals sought some form of political cooperation cross state/national boundaries, which certainly does happen, then couldn’t they be connected to internationalism too? That said, Motadel makes a compelling argument on the matter, by stating that, “As nationalist movements across the imperial world gained momentum in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, governments increasingly made efforts to support them in order to undermine the sovereignty of their adversaries’ empires.” (Motadel, p. 844) This is the strongest correlation I was able to find from the readings. It makes sense that imperialist governments would seek to undermine their competitors by supporting cross border nationalist movements which are typically associated with the far-right. This approach can certainly be viewed as falling under what I established earlier as a baseline definition for internationalism.
Reading’s Cited:
Paul Hanebrink, A Specter Haunting Europe: The Myth of Judeo-Bolshevism (Harvard University Press, 2018), pp. 1-10, 11-45.
David Motadel, “The Global Authoritarian Moment: The Revolt Against Empire” American Historical Review Vol. 124, Issue 3 (July 2019): 843-877.
German Fascism, Italian Fascism, and Fascist Inconsistency
Owen Billo
The readings for this week, as they related to each other, all reminded me of Paxton’s article from last week, specifically where he argues that fascism is different from the other -isms. He says that fascism is not based on a consistent framework or philosophical tradition, but will instead believe in and do anything it deems necessary to achieve the stated ‘destiny’ of the in-group and, presumably, to defeat the out-group. While I don’t believe this is a complete definition, I do believe that it has a lot of truth to it, as we have seen fascist movements being incredibly inconsistent.
The best examples I saw were Motadel’s articles, which focus on the collaboration between anti-colonialist nationalists and the Nazis. The Nazis made it no secret that they viewed non-aryans as racially inferior, and yet they were happy to work with them simply because it helped them fight the Allies and achieve their supposed destiny. It was also convenient because Germany no longer had a traditional colonial empire, something that Italy did have. This is why Italy took a different path, opting to work towards their own supposed destiny through their colonial empire. And yet, as Ben-Ghiat discusses, Italy (rather abruptly) ended up bowing to Germany, accepting institutionalized anti-semitism and a less colonial approach because this had suddenly become more feasible for achieving Italian national ‘destiny.’
This understanding gives an interesting perspective on the Judeo-Bolshevism conspiracy theory analyzed by Hanebrink. An alliance between communists and Jewish capitalist bankers (which sounds ridiculous because it is) can only make sense from a fascist perspective where any alliance is ok so long as it moves you towards ‘destiny.’
The Importance of a Leader?
By: Melyssa Clark
History is an important tool in which we can trace back threads to the past in adding our understanding of how contemporary events are not created from a rupture. This is depicted through this week’s course material that traces back how modern populism is derived from Fascist ideology that emerged from Italy in 1919. The support for both of these ideologies are fuelled by crises that create division amongst insiders and outsiders within society as well as a political system. Although the authors work at contributing to a better understanding of populism as a term, whether in isolation or through a path dependency approach of a historical comparison to fascism, there is one important idea that various authors alluded to that could be further developed. That idea being the use of an actor-based approach that highlights the important role that populist leaders have in these movements. One of the main definers of populism is the division between “the people” and “the elites” effectively, this creates a need for collective action to have the people’s voice heard and remove the elites from power. In turn, it’s important to have a charismatic leader who is able to frame various crises through the democratized media and create a call to action to mobilize “the people”. The most cohesive example amongst the authors that illustrate this is Trump’s rise to power in 2016. Brubaker highlights Trump’s likability, relative to Clinton, and the means through which he uses the media to frame issues to create distrust of institutions and elites amongst the public.
The right, left, vertical, and horizontal by Francesco Sacca.
Hello everyone!
An odd title for this article I know but it does get the point across on the topics that I wish to discuss. In this post I will mainly be focusing on 2 sections of the material that we were assigned for this week, the podcast from NUPI (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) and the writing created by Federico Finchelstein, titled From Fascism to Populism in History.
Firstly, in the podcast with Rogers Brubaker, there is one point in particular that should be discussed and that is his classification of the three sections and uses of populism. In the first section, Brubaker discusses the ordinary (and or working class) and how they are pitted against the elite (in which there is a suggestion to reorganize the political system), the second section is the sovereign portion, prioritizing “a politics of re-democratization”. The third classification that Brubaker gives is “ethnically bounded”, though in my opinion, this third section can include the elements of both section 1 and section 2, therefore this portion should be clarified more clearly as a separate entity. Both the sovereign and the ordinary, despite their differences, can potentially be united under a unified body of ethnicity and or nationality (I will make this more clear and provide an example in class).
Secondly, this idea of a shared ethnicity and nationality through the social/political classes is not represented just once in this week’s material. In the text supplied from Federico, the theme continues when discussing the focuses and priorities of the far right, “populists on the right connect this populist intolerance of alternative political views with a conception of the people formed on the basis of ethnicity and country of origin. In short, right-wing populists are xenophobic.”. Through what is said here, it may be implied that fascist politicians attempt to inspire fear in those that are “ethnically bonded” through the use of the “imposing” outside world (an example is provided via this link where Donald Trump discusses Mexico and its connection with job availability in the United States. https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/07/donald-trump-in-phoenix-mexicans-are-taking-our-jobs-and-killing-us.html).
I will be ready to discuss more in person but let this be a prelude to what I will bring up in person.
The Pitfalls of Equating Populism with Fascism
Frank
One of the issues presented in the readings that I found particularly interesting was the discussion around populism versus fascism. I have often equated the two when discussing the rise of far-right populist movements in contemporary politics. I have come to realize that doing so can have a negative impact on public discourse, potentially fanning the flames of political tensions.
Finchelstein pushes against people who conflate populism and fascism with anything that stands against liberal democracy. He also has a bone to pick with “pundits and politicians” who use fascism to describe not only populism, but also authoritarian regimes or international terrorism. My initial reaction was to question his argument: While I appreciated his nuance when defining these terms, I also believed that labelling populist movements that advocated for exclusionary ethno-nationalist politics as fascist movements was a useful tool to shock and scare people into action against these dangerous political movements. If they walk like a duck, and quack like a duck, then why can’t they be fascit?
This type of anti-populist discourse evidently worsens relations between liberal-democrats and populists. The equation of populism and fascism as political rhetoric can be a form of anti-populism. Mudde argues it is a “mirror image” of populism, as it establishes both a monist (us versus them) and a moralist (populists are morally corrupt) position that leaves no room for compromise. Thus, the equation of fascism with populism further solidifies the sentiments held among populist-democrats that they are being marginalized by the liberal democratic system and that their political antagonists are “enemies of the people,” further widening the gap between them and liberal democrats.
As Paxton argues, fascist states were established and maintained by the “solid texture of everyday experience and the complicity of ordinary people,” and that these states could not have grown without the help of these people. Perhaps labelling populists as fascists could push people further down the path towards the more violent and extreme ideology of fascism.
Sources: Federico Finchelstein, “Introduction: Thinking Fascism and Populism in terms of the Past” in Federico Finkelstein, From Fascism to Populism in History (University of California Press, 2017).
Cas Mudde, “Populism in Europe: An Illiberal Democratic Response to Undemocratic
Liberalism” (The Government and Opposition/Leonard Schapiro Lecture 2019). Government and Opposition, (2021): 1-21.
Robert Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York, 2004), pp 3-23.
Fighting with definitions of Fascism and Populism
In each of the readings this week, analysis was mostly focused on understanding Fascism and Populism, especially in regards to differentiating the two. As underlined in Finchelstein’s From Fascism to Populism in History, though the terms are both used in a colloquial sense to label others as “evil,” they do not share the same ideology, often even having clashing ideals. Though the work offers a good framework for discerning between the two, the categories lead to questioning regarding the gray area between Populism and Fascism. In Paxton’s work, he points out the “fascist minimum” as a concept which would hope to tidy up problems in separating the two. However, his further explanation that Fascist regimes were different from one another, primarily due to their inherently nationalistic ideology.
Facing these different ideas in the readings, a few questions arose in my mind. Though I don’t doubt the usefulness of these categories, are they entirely beneficial in analyzing different movements? Could they be detrimental to better understanding of the similarities and differences that appear? Where do we define the line between the two? Though Finchelstein gives his own interpretation, can it really be said that each of the stated elements is absolutely necessary to call a movement Fascist?
I believe these considerations are especially pertinent in observing new movements which may not fit into either category. Trying to force them into our own categories could lead to a false sense of understanding, where our own biases may cloud our judgment on history.
Introduction
Hey everyone!
I’m Felix, a fourth-year student in EURUS. Though the program of course covers Europe and Russia as a whole, my focus has been mostly on Germany. In that same vein, I’m very passionate in regards to languages, especially German and Hungarian. I usually find myself dabbling in other languages every once in a while though…
Outside of school, I usually find myself gaming or climbing. I usually try to find a few occasions throughout the year to escape outdoors and climb in the rocks, though I’m usually confined to the gym.
Looking forward to getting to know you all better throughout this course!
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