Transforming Memories

by Sydney Linholm

The article by Helmut Walser Smith discusses Hugo Spiegel and his efforts to reunify German and Jewish communities while simultaneously honouring the memory of Jews in small-town cemeteries that were destroyed by the Nazi regime. The article focuses on communities that were affected by Kristallnacht and Nazism, and how Germans and Jews have come together to help German communities face their unsavoury pasts and focus on a future that moves away from the throes of the Second World War while commemorating those who lost their lives.

This article presents a really intriguing perspective on rebuilding small German communities following the Second World War. More often than not, this is overlooked in favour of larger-scale issues, such as the prosecution of Nazis. Helmut Walser Smith’s article highlights the importance of community in the commemoration of the Jewish graves that were destroyed during Kristallnacht and the bonding between small-town Germans and Jews who have returned to their hometowns after the war. This enforces that it is vitally important that Germans must work together with Jews in order to present an honest, critical reflection on German history and that this comes in the form of local German and Jewish actors repairing cemeteries and synagogues, putting up plaques, and other commemorative actions.

While the author points out that Germany’s past was hardly its own, the repairing of divides is still crucial to the honest and critical retelling of German history. The hometowns that once egged on Nazis while they destroyed Jewish graves and synagogues have, and must continue, making strides to repair the relationship with Jewish citizens that they had once wronged. In accepting and bringing their separate accounts of history together, they commemorate those whose lives were lost under the Nazi regime and move forward in transforming Germany’s nefarious past.

The Changing of Memory

By: Willem Nesbitt

Over the course of thirty years, Hugo Spiegel fought for his hometown of Warendorf to erect a monument to commemorate the Holocaust. Having survived the horrors of Dachau and Auschwitz, the last of which took his young daughter’s life, Hugo exemplified the gradual shift in Germany memory of the Holocaust during the latter half of the twentieth century. With surviving Jews emigrating to Israel and America en masse, author Helmut Walser Smith describes how the act of commemoration and remembrance of the Holocaust gradually came into form over the years, with, as outlined by Michael Rothberg, eventually culminating in the “Historikerstreit” in the 1980s. While both authors do attempt to address why it took so long for Germany to reconcile its past, Smith placing emphasis on the idea of German-Jewish co-operation and Rothberg highlighting larger, public commemorations such as Schindler’s List and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, both articles gloss over German society itself. While I understand it may be difficult to accurately look into the feelings and actions of an entire population, the articles leave me wondering why it was that the Holocaust fell by the wayside for so long in public consciousness. Was it shame, or perhaps embarrassment? Was it because those who lived through the war themselves did not want to speak of it, and it was only the younger generations who finally picked up the torch?

The paths that memories make

Some memories can be too painful to deal with and people will choose to bury them in the back of their mind, letting it collect dust then face up to it head-on and deal with lasting consequences. They can either leave scars that retain bitter reminders of a dark time but they can also serve as a way to redemption and reconciliation but only if the memory is brought out from the darkness and brought to light. Like Hugo Spiegel who returned to his hometown to rebuild his life after the war, he also sought to rebuild and remind those of the tragedy that not only he endured but Jews everywhere. People did not want to be reminded, or think about that dark time but just because something is hard to deal with doesn’t mean you can push it down and block it out. Remembrance is an essential part of the healing process, confronting what happened in all forms from Spiegel’s attempt at erecting a simple memorial plaque is a very simple reminder of the essence of Holocaust remembrance. It is what gave us culturally significant moments such as “Schindler’s List; the Stockholm Declaration of 2000 making commemoration of the Nazi genocide central to European identity; and the 2005 dedication, after years of debate and controversy, of the vast Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in the center of Berlin.” (Walser Smith, 2021)

While rekindling a memory can help heal, it can also cause blowback. The holocaust was a tragedy of epic proportions but the changed meaning of Holocaust memory has become distorted as we get further and further away from the end of WWII. Comparisons have been utilized by conservative thinkers that have used the juxtaposition of Nazism with Stalinism and liberal thinkers who focus more on colonial violence, slavery, and, more broadly, coming to terms with anti-Black racism. Was the gulag system similar to concentration camps? Was the forced migration of Africans comparable to the forced deportation of Jews? It doesn’t matter if one group suffered more than the other as it dilutes and lessens the necessity for responsibility. More so, it is important that the relationship between the oppressed and the oppressor can come to terms with the past through mediums such as “community work, the necessity of reaching across divides, and the crucial role that local school teachers, archivists, retirees, hobby historians, and preservationists may well play in the great transformations of a nation’s memory.” (Walser Smith, 2021)


Michael Rothberg, “Comparing Comparison: From the “Historikerstreit to the Mbembe
Affair” Geschichte der Gegenwart September 23, 2020

Helmut Walser Smith, “It Takes a Village to Create a Nation’s Memory” Zocalo Public

Denazification: Victims of Circumstance or Mass Murderers?

Jackie Howell

While I studied at the University of Windsor, I participated in an elective course on German cinema. I am neither a film major nor a German history major, but films and the political aspects of their dissemination intrigued me. What struck me most was not the documentaries of the Holocaust but the films produced in the 1930s and 1940s and post-war. The films created during the Third Reich illustrated how German identity transformed post-WWI to adopt a prideful, nationalist sentiment with anti-Semitic undertones. The post-war films juxtaposed these films by addressing the collective guilt of the Germans. Mapping the transformation of the German identity is best illustrated in the cultural texts produced during this period. Sollors situates his argument through a cultural context and uses books and songs to depict the limits of the Fragebogen in assessing Nazism in Germany. Cultural texts can help unpack the shortcomings of the denazification process, particularly focusing on the extent of justice and guilt in Europe.

One of the dangers of remembering Nazi Germany is oversimplifying the Germans’ participation in the Third Reich. Fulbrook speaks to the myriad of participation in the podcast interview, examining how some Germans felt they were a “victim of circumstance” while others enjoyed their involvement. This begs the question: how do you bring a population to justice without considering the circumstances? Is each individual responsible for the actions of the Third Reich, or are some considered innocent bystanders? Fulbrook illustrates how participation is not simple to define, which the Fragebogen failed to consider. Sollors reaffirms the shortcomings of the Fragebogen by also addressing the oversimplification of “weeding out” Nazism through a questionnaire.  

However, it is also dangerous to underestimate the Germans’ accountability in the Third Reich. While they may not have pulled the trigger themselves, the Germans’ complicity deserves recognition and proper punishment. West Germany failed to properly punish all of those involved in the Third Reich’s atrocities, as the mismatch between the scale of horror and the number of those punished was massive. While East Germany did convict perpetrators with more severe sentences, one must question if the Soviets’ underlying hatred for the Germans fueled their higher conviction rate.

It is not sufficient to say “never again” to the atrocities. To right history, historians must examine how and why people become involved in a system of mass murder and how to deal with it afterward. Perhaps commemoration can be a start to remembering the atrocities and identities lost in collective violence. However, it is equally important to address how this act of collective violence occurred in the first place to prevent future atrocities.  


Fulbrook, M. (2019). Reckonings: Legacies of Nazi persecution and the quest for justice [podcast].

Smith, H. W. (2021, Jan. 11). It takes a village to create a nation’s memory. Zocalo Public Square.

Sollors, W. (2018). ‘Everybody gets Fragebogened sooner or later’: The denazification questionnaire as cultural text. German Life and Letters 71(2), 139-153.

In Memory of the Holocaust

Sara Dix

When looking at history, it is the memory that holds the most impact. It gives insight to a specific event in time that has impacted so many people, yet memories of various events can vary from person to person. Sollors discusses the “Fragebogen” questionnaire that asked people to recollect their role during the Holocause whereas Smith provides an anecdote to explain how the cooperation of between Germans and Jews has created a nationwide memory of the consequences post-WWII.

It’s interesting how the questionnaire appeared as a part of the denazification campaign by the Allies during the second half of the 1940s. It was a way to identify people who affiliated themselves with the Nazi Party and prohibited any sort of Nazi activity or benefits. The “Fragebogen” was important in the process of denazification, but even if they were completed under the oath of honesty, it would have been extremely difficult for the Allies to ensure that people told the truth. In that respect, the Germans who felt too ashamed and guilty for their actions could have easily lied about their experiences and associations.

The story of Hugo Spiegel shows how it takes a collective from both sides to come together and find some kind of reconciliation. Smith emphasizes that a country cannot face up to its past alone which is why Germans needed help from Jews in order to work towards a more inclusive and accepting environment. Even though his own daughter was killed in a concentration camp, Spiegel was still able to work with Germans in order and that just shows how the Jews who did return to their hometowns were willing to work with people who may have antagonized them just to create a better life in Germany.

Works Cited

W. Sollors, “Everybody Gets Fragebogened Sooner or Later’: The Denazification Questionnaire as Cultural Text.” German Life & Letters. Vol 71, Issue 2 (2018): 139-153

Helmut Walser Smith, “It Takes a Village to Create a Nation’s Memory” Zocalo Public Sphere

Traumatic Realism in Memory and Coming to Terms with Comparisons to the Holocaust

By: Bryce Greer

I want to preface by saying that I take my reflection in a slightly different way then most of my other responses to other week’s readings. This week spoke different volumes to me when discussing memory in history.

Back in high school, maybe when I was 14 or 15, I remember my high school history teacher bringing in a guest speaker. It pains me that I do not recall her name, but what she talked about- her experiences of the residential schools in Canada- have been deeply rooted into my memory. The Indigenous woman, who stood before me in the classroom, spoke of her trauma on a history that I had never been previously taught. It was her voice and her story that I came to recollect in my own memory when reflecting on the readings this week. It is why I want to reflect on traumatic realism in memory as something that I think can speak to one of the lessons from the atrocities committed by Nazism with regards to the Holocaust.

The use of the phrase “traumatic realism” I take from one of Michael Rothberg’s book titles as a way to primarily have a conversation with his article “Comparing Comparisons” this week. In the article, he discusses the Historikerstreit and the debate around the uniqueness of the Holocaust, something recently returned in the contemporary alongside the rise of the far-right. I could not help but see the political use of the Holocaust by both the Left and Right today as something that highlights the exact issues when coming toward the debate. And Rothberg sums it up well on how we need to approach the debate: comparing an atrocious genocide to Auschwitz is not “unthinkable [but] how one does it and why are where the crux of the ethical and political matter lies.”

To me, there is a political game being played around the current debate of the uniqueness of the Holocaust. To look at it simply, the truthful answer is that the Holocaust is unique. The violence, the suffering, the trauma, it is all unique. On a global scale: colonialism, the Gulag, and the current Chinese internment camp of Uyghur Muslims all hold their own uniqueness to the violence, suffering, and trauma. Where the comparison of these atrocities lie is by understanding the histories through the stories of those who hold the memories, the traumas, as they come forward to speak about them. It takes sympathetic ears to see how trauma is something shared in each of these histories.

Mary Fulbrook had noted in her book that the evolution of memory culture was abused outside the stories, creating a sense where those who were “uniquely” suffering or suffered the most, became this desirable status in a perverse twist. (366) Yet the trauma in memory is unique to every individual, and hearing the story sympathetically is the way forward for the listener and the speaker in continuing the memory. Sympathy to these traumas should not be ranked. The story of Hugo Spiegel in Helmut Smith’s reading is unique to him, and as I read and come to learn of his story, it will become one that I remember as he spoke of his trauma following the Holocaust. Now, when I look back at the Indigenous woman who spoke to me only 8 years ago, I see her unique story compared to his as both memories of a past downplayed to simplicity. One must escape bureaucratic history-making for comparison, as it is the memory of these stories that can show comparative sympathy to both victims of the past and those that still suffer today.


Mary Fulbrook. Reckonings : Legacies of Nazi Persecution and the Quest for Justice. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Michael Rothberg, “Comparing Comparison: From the “Historikerstreit to the Mbembe
Affair” Geschichte der Gegenwart September 23, 2020

Helmut Walser Smith, “It Takes a Village to Create a Nation’s Memory” Zocalo Public

De-Radicalizing and Remembering: Coming to Grips with the Nazi Past and Collective Violence in the Present

By Austin Pellizzer

Since the end of the Second World War in 1945, historians have been in constant debate about how a nation should remember horrific events of war, especially the Holocaust. However, before looking at a more contemporary vision, one should look at the earliest steps used to combat the evil ideology of nazism at the end of the war.

In Werner Sollor’s article “Everybody Gets Fragebogened Sooner or Later’: The Denazification Questionnaire as Cultural Text.”, Sollor describes how allied forces tried to de-radicalize and rehabilitate German society in the forms of questionnaires (139). These 131 question documents were used by the American forces to screen citizens for future employment in the new German state (142). However, this calls into question how effective it is for foreign actors to impose particular methods of de-radicalization onto groups (149). While it is true that Sollor discusses that it was, in fact, the German Marxists who coined this term of “denazification” (153), it was still used on mass by the allies. This article also points out a lack of oversight, trustworthiness, and resentment towards the Americans for demonstrating grandstanding gestures on a defeated enemy (149). Because of this, Sollor believes this action was a failed attempt at trying to change a society’s ideology through these particular means (140). 

In the same breath, Dan Snow’s podcast with Professor Mary Fulbrook addresses the idea of contemporary remembrance of these tragedies. In this talk, the topic of how one can become complacent and a critical actor in a killing machine was of great interest. However, one question which was brought up and in need of an explanation is as follows. What can be done in the contemporary age to try and deter society from adopting radical ideologies, becoming radicalized, and complacent in mass murder?

Works Cited

Mary Fulbrook, Reckonings: Legacies of Nazi Persecution and the Quest for Justice podcast, 2019.

W. Sollors,“Everybody Gets Fragebogened Sooner or Later’: The Denazification Questionnaire as Cultural Text.” German Life & Letters. Vol 71, Issue 2 (2018): 139-153.

Nazis that got away

Sollors’ article on the Fragebogen brings attention to the process of denazification through the particular mean of answering a detailed questionnaire. This bureaucratic response to a phenomenon that penetrated all spheres of life just a few years before seems, in my opinion, a rather weak approach to the elimination of Nazism.

The first aspect which I found troubling is the honesty of the answers. The questions were, as mentioned, embarrassing for some, and could prevent people from getting jobs, so I can imagine that the temptation of lying, or at least concealing incriminating facts, would be present. They were also very specific (an example was to tell for which party one had voted in November 1932 and March 1933). False answers were apparently punished and could be verified with archived files of membership. The punishments were public in order to discourage others to lie. But there were limits to this system, as it is reported by the article that it was suspected that many still lied. Membership could easily be checked out with an access to SS files, for example. But in the instance of a vote that occurred years ago, how could it be confirmed? Someone could simply have forgotten, or could answer with a political party that would not undermine his future job. I don’t know how voting worked in Germany in the 1930s, but I doubt that records were kept on who voted for whom. But if so, that would be a very interesting aspect of democracy to study.

This specific process of denazification in the immediate post-war years tallies with one of the objectives of the Nuremberg trial of purging Germany from the remnants of the Third Reich. Apart from trying to ensure that workers have no history of association with the Nazi Party, bringing known criminals to justice was also a way of getting a clean slate. An eye-catching point in this article is the complaint that real Nazis got away. Some were tried, less of-interest had to file a questionnaire, but some were exonerated, and some, in the real sense of the word, got away. This particular point took me through an interesting search on Nazi hunters, people that dedicated their time to finding Nazis that had escaped and hid in South America. This documentary (in French… this youtuber is my go-to for videos about “fun” historical facts, but there are many others on the subject of Nazi hunting) retraces the story of Klaus Barbie, a former Gestapo chief in Lyon, France, who was able, with the help of the American government that needed information he possessed on French communist parties, to leave Germany and spend years in Bolivia. Nazi hunters were able to find him in the 1970s, and during an interview, a French journalist, asking a question in French that caught Barbie off guard, could identify him. What is frustrating is that it still took about 20 years before he was brought back to France to be tried, but in the end justice won… but there are more that escaped it, in South America, or just in Germany, with lies and loopholes.

At one point though, wherever former Nazi criminals are, they will all be dead. But just the fact that some didn’t get caught and were able to spend good years in another country, away from the suffering that their crime had caused, is probably not helping with the coping of the Holocaust that is questioned, challenged and put in perspective today, as shown by comparisons in Rothberg’s article.

Works cited:

W. Sollors,“Everybody Gets Fragebogened Sooner or Later’: The Denazification Questionnaire as Cultural Text.” German Life & Letters. Vol 71, Issue 2 (2018): 139-153.

Michael Rothberg, “Comparing Comparison: From the “Historikerstreit to the Mbembe Affair” Geschichte der Gegenwart September 23, 2020

Watchin’ the Tide Roll Away?

By Absalom Sink

It’s becoming a tiresome cliché, isn’t it? Almost as tiresome as the cliché from a few years ago: that of a ‘rising tide of far-right populism’ in Europe. And while that old number is still getting plenty of play, it seems like every month there’s a handful of new articles and op-eds pontificating on whether the ‘populist tide’ has peaked and begun to ebb.

To be fair, I can understand the urge behind writing pieces like those. The ‘populist right’ has been dealt a number of blows this year. There was the “stunning rebuke” against populism in Slovakia with the election of centre-left, liberal Zuzana Caputova. Just over a week ago in Bologna, Italy, a rally held by the populist Matteo Salvini and attended by a little under 6000 supporters was counter-protested by between 12000 and 15000 people. Similarly, far-right rallies held last week by Pegida in Dresden and the ultranationalist NPD in Hannover were dwarfed by counter-protesters. And it’s hard not to see 13500 people marching in Paris against Islamophobia as a raised middle finger aimed at the Rassemblement National (RN), the political embodiment of Islamophobia in France. Finally, let’s not forget the “collapse of the far-right” in the Austrian election this past September, when the FPO lost 10% of the overall vote as compared to the last election because of a corruption scandal.

The problem is when we try to use events like these to extrapolate out over the whole of Europe. In fact, just framing it as the populist right is problematic. Certainly, there are transnational connections between populist movements/parties, but there is no single, monolithic populism. These groups cooperate to the extent that it’s practical. But if, say, Germany’s AfD were to suddenly founder, it’s a fair bet that the Swiss Peoples’ Party and the RN and the Sweden Democrats—far-right populists, all—would let them sink before risking their own positions. By lumping all these groups together when declaring that the ‘populist tide is receding’, we massively oversimply a complex transnational political situation.

Aside from oversimplifying things, there’s also the worry that such statements might make voters complacent; believing the threat to be behind them, voters might have less impetus to vote. The problem is a number of far-right populist parties in Europe still have fairly robust polling numbers. Germany’s AfD has held steady at 13-14% in the national polls for two years, while in Thuringia’s state election last month it came second, with over 23% of the vote. In France, Marine Le Pen’s RN is actually leading the presidential poll, hovering around 28%. Even in Austria, where the ‘Ibiza affair’ saw the FPÖ drop by 10% in the last election, they picked up enough seats that they were able to maintain their coalition government with the winning ÖVP. How can we claim that far-right populism has peaked when a party like the ‘formerly’ fascist Sweden Democrats are poised to become the biggest party in their country, and could conceivably with the 2022 election?

My point in all of this is simply that journalists and political observers alike should be wary of making sweeping declarations on the state of far-right populism. Europe is bigger and more diverse than we sometimes recognize; when we’re talking about an entire continent, it’s worth remembering that high tide happens at different times in Helsinki, Finland and Cadiz, Spain. The same goes for the metaphorical tide. While populism might ebb in one region, it can still be in flood in another.

Europe’s Radical Right: Cultural Descendant of the Nouvelle Droite

By Absalom Sink

Two weeks ago, we read and discussed the rise of the Nouvelle Droite (ND), first in France, and then in a broader, pan-European context. Crucial to the formulation of the ND was its retreat from the political arena into the realm of culture, the realm of “metapolitics”. Seeing in the protests of 1968 the sway that the Left held over cultural institutions—particularly institutions of higher education—far right figures led by Alain de Benoist ostensibly abandoned politics and moved instead to open up cultural space in which later generations of Far Right thinkers and politicians might act; they appropriated from the Left Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, and worked to sow the seeds of a counterhegemonic bloc.

From this week’s readings, I would argue that the experiment is something of a qualified success. Certainly, most of today’s so-called Radical Right1 have not taken up de Benoist’s neopagan ritualism. And the populist, self-described “democratic” nature of Radical Right movements is inherently contrary to the ND’s anti-democratic, elitist formulation. But as the readings make clear, there are crucial threads linking the ND and the Radical Right. Chief among them is ethnopluralism. As Ina Schmidt explains, “Ethnopluralism is an ideology of the far right, which is no longer directed against foreign ethnicities, but rather against cultures—understood as being irrevocably connected with certain values, practices, and habits.” Essentially, it is a form of cultural racism, as opposed to the biological racism of yore, popular with fascists. By shifting the focus of their xenophobia from “race” to “culture”, Radical Right groups avoid the charge of racism and open ideological space between themselves and fascist forebears. It’s the ideological sleight of hand that lets Islamophobes respond to charges of racism with the stock sentence “Islam isn’t a race!” And as we’ll recall from Tamir Bar-On’s article, it is the same semantic shift that de Benoist and his followers made in the 1980s, moving from biological racism to the anti-multicultural “Europe of a Hundred Flags”.

It does not really matter that groups like Pegida or the Front National don’t adhere entirely to the roadmap laid down by the ND. Remember, the goal of the ND was simply to create the cultural space in which Far Right ideals might be taken once more into the political sphere—ideals like the abandonment of liberal democracy, and at least since the 1980s, of ethnopluralism over multiculturalism. By achieving broader cultural acceptance, as evinced by de Benoist’s Prix de l’essai from l’Académie Française and glowing coverage in Telos, the ND was able to open that political space it desired. It now needed political actors to take up the mantle. As both Zack Beauchamp—in his interview with our old friend Cas Mudde—and Pietro Castelli Gattinara show, a series of events in 2015 would provide the spark for an explosion of Radical Right movements to occupy that space, a sort of Far Right Big Bang.

According to Mudde, “the core of the ideology of the radical right includes three features: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.” Nativism, he says, is essentially a form of xenophobia that dictates that a state should only be inhabited by people who are “native” to it.2 Authoritarianism revolves around the belief that society should be “strictly ordered”, and in which any social issue becomes treated as an issue of security—the example Mudde gives here is the treatment of drug crises as “something to be cracked down on” through law and order, rather than as a public health issue. Finally, populism boils down to another “us versus them” dichotomy, this time between “the elites”—typically mainstream political figures, but with a healthy helping of wealthy proponents of liberalism, like the far right’s bogeyman George Soros—and “the real people”.3 2015 brought a confluence of factors that served to empower nascent Radical Right movements throughout Europe. First, the refugee crisis, stoked nativist fears throughout Europe. Terror attacks, starting with Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015, fueled authoritarian tendencies and calls for increased vigilance, particularly against ‘outsiders.’ Finally, the lingering effects of the 2008 financial crisis and the aftershocks that threatened the structural integrity of the EU undermined the existing economic liberal order and played into populist anti-elitist rhetoric.

Julius Evola knew he would never see a truly resurgent fascism in his lifetime; it is entirely possible that Alain de Benoist never thought he’d see the ideological seeds he sowed bear fruit. But a series of external shocks—a financial crisis originating in the United States, revolutions throughout the Middle East leading to a nearly decade-long civil war in Syria, the rise of ISIL, and the largest refugee crisis since the Bosnian War—provided the cover for a broad range of Radical Right political movements to spring up in the cultural niche carved out by the ND.

1Borrowing here from Cas Mudde’s differentiation between “Extreme Right” and “Radical Right”, in which the former rejects democracy outright in favour of revolution aiming for authoritarianism, while the latter merely rejects aspects of liberal democracy, like pluralism and minority rights, while still claiming to adhere to democratic principles. Castelli Gattinara helps to further clarify, explaining that radical right groups “locate themselves outside the political mainstream but without intending to replace democracy with an authoritarian order.”

2Remember, though, from our very first class, when we grappled with the question of “who is really ‘native’ to a given place?” The Magyar people claim ownership of Hungary, even though they are likely to have arrived significantly later that the ancestors of today’s Slovenes within the borders of Hungary. Likewise, how “native” is a person who calls themselves an “Anglo-Saxon”—itself an incredibly fraught term—to Britain?

3”The real people” has become something of a shibboleth for Far- and Radical Right groups, differentiating them from Left populists; as Jan Werner-Muller explains, the term serves to “other” any who don’t fit with the “majority”, while also delegitimizing any other groups and figures vying for power.

Works Cited:

Beauchamp, Zack. “An expert on the European far right explains the growing influence of anti-immigrant politics”. Vox. May 31, 2016

Bar-On, Tamir. “Transnationalism and the French Nouvelle Droite.” Patterns of Prejudice 45, no. 3 (July 2011): 199–223.

Castelli Gattinara, Pietro. “Framing Exclusion in the Public Sphere: Far-Right Mobilisation and the Debate on Charlie Hebdo in Italy.” South European Society & Politics 22, no. 3 (Sept. 2017): 345–364.

Schmidt, Ina. “PEGIDA: A Hybrid Form of a Populist Right Movement.” German Politics & Society 35, no. 4 (Winter 2017): 105–17.

“The Dangers of Populism” Interview with Jan Werner Mueller, Council of Europe (March 2017)